Trade liberalization experience in the Philippines, 1960-84 by Alburo, Florian & Shepherd, Geoffrey
 
PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
Working Paper No. 86-01 
 
 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION EXPERIENCE 
IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1960-84 
 
By 
 
Florian Alburo and Geoffrey Shepherd∗ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 1985 
                                                 
 
 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of PIDS. 
 
∗ Associate Professor, School of Economics, University of the Philippines and Senior Fellow, Science 
Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, U.K. 
  
CONTENTS 
 
 
                Page (s) 
Acknowledgements 
 
Introduction          i-iii 
 
Part  I: The Economic Background………………………………… 1 
 
 
Part  II: Notes on the First Liberalization 
   Episode:  Foreign Exchange 
   Decontrol: 1960-65………………………………………. 46 
 
 
Part   III: The Second Liberalization Episode: 
   Devaluation and the Growth of 
   Non-Traditional Exports, 1970-80………………………… 53 
 
 
 
Part  IV: The Third Liberalization Episode: 
   The Tariff Reform Program, 1981-85……………………. 103 
 
 
 
Part  V: Some Concluding Remarks………………………………… 152 
 
 
 
References………………………………………………………………………… 158 
 
  
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 The authors wish to thank Aurea Crisostomo, Bienvenido Oplas, Jr. and Danny 
Uy for their research assistance, as well as Laila Garcia for her typing. 
 
 This paper presents some initial results from a project undertaken at PIDS on 
trade liberalization in the Philippines.  The research has been financed by the World Bank 
as a country study within a broader, cross-country project on the timing and sequencing 
of trade liberalization policies. The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily 
those of PIDS or the World Bank. 
Part I 
 
THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
 
A.The Economys Attributes 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This description of the Philippine economys attributes is not meant to be an 
exhaustive specification of economic characteristics but an overview of some factors 
which may be relevant to the process of implementing a trade liberalization policy. To 
the extent possible, we aim in this description to cover the period from the fifties to 1983. 
The Philippines comprises 7,107 islands with a land area of 115,739 square miles.  
It lies on the western edge of the Pacific Ocean and the country stretches more than a 
thousand miles from north to south and about 700 miles from east to west. More than half 
of the countrys population live on the two largest islands, Luzon and Mindanao. This 
tells of the wide disparities of the island sizes such that less than a tenth of them are 
actually inhabited. 
Both the countrys size and population of 52.8 million (1983) are comparable to 
such Asian countries as Thailand in terms of size and population, Pakistan and Burma in 
terms of size.  In the 1971 the Philippines population was comparable with South Korea1. 
 
2. Population and Labor Force 
 
The Philippines continues to be one of the developing countries with high 
population growth rates.2  Its yearly growth rate has been 2.9 percent between 1950 and 
1983.  The pattern of this average growth rate however has been an acceleration until the 
decade of the seventies before leveling off to 2.7 percent per year in 1980-1983. As a 
result population density has been increasing. Table I.1 presents basic population 
indicators. 
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Table I.1 
Population Indicators 
1950-1983 
       
              
   Number  Density  Annual Population 
Year  (millions)  (persons/sq. km.)  Growth Rate 
            (percent) 
1950  20.3  67.6  - 
1960  27.1  90.3  2.9 
1970  36.7  122.3  3.0 
1980  48.3  100.3  2.7 
1983  52.8  172.8  2.7 
1984 a 53.4  177.4  2.7 
              
       
a/  advance estimate     
       
Source:  NCSO     
 
This persistent high population growth rate over a long time period has been 
associated with uneven internal migration into urban areas, more progressive regions, and 
broad areas or industrial growth. This seems to have worsened over time between 1948 
and 1975. For example, of the migration flows from the Visayas in 1948-1960, 28.4 
percent moved to Luzon. The proportion increased to 37.2 percent in 1960-1970 and 48.4 
percent in 1970-1975.  Movements into Luzon have been continuous from the rest of the 
country with only a slight outflow from Luzon itself to the Visayas. 
 At the regional level, 8 out of 12 regions (excluding the National Capital Region) 
have been regions of net outmigration during the decade of the seventies  heavy in 
Bicol, Western Visayas, Central and Eastern Visayas, declining in the Cagayan Valley 
and Western Mindanao. The National Capital Region (NCR) has seen an influx in 1975-
1980 that was 2.63 times the flow in 1970-1975. Table I.2 and I.3  portray the extent of 
internal migration over the 1948-1975 period by three major geographic regions and by 
five regional breakdowns. Notice the decline in migration from the Visayas to Mindanao 
after 1970 in contrast to the strong policy encouragement of migration earlier (during the 
fifties and the sixties). The strength of this policy push during that period is also evident 
for migration from Luzon and for people remaining in Mindanao. 
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Table I.2 
Internal Migration by Broad Region of Origin and 
Broad Region of Destination: 1948-1975 
       
              
Broad Origin of Broad Region of Origin 
Destination/Period Luzon  Visayas  Mindanao 
              
              
1948-1960 a/       
         
  All Regions 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  Luzon 88.1 28.4 13.4 
  Visayas 3.6 16.8 13.2 
  Mindanao 8.2 54.8 73.4 
         
1960-1970  b/       
         
  All Regions 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  Luzon 85.7 37.2 18.0 
  Visayas 6.9 8.9 22.4 
  Mindanao 7.4 53.9 59.6 
         
1970-1975  c/       
         
  All Regions 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  Luzon 82.9 48.4 16.4 
  Visayas 12.2 13.3 25.9 
  Mindanao 4.9 38.3 57.7 
              
a/ Figures include only migrants approximately 11 years old and over and are  
based on a 0.5 percent sample of the 1960 census.    
       
b/ Figures refer to persons 10 years old and over.    
c/ Figures refer to persons 5 years old and over and are based on a 0.5  
 percent sample of the 1975 census.     
       
Source:        
 Aurora Perez, "Trends and Patterns in Spatial Mobility," in M. Concepcion (ed.),  
 Population of the Philippines:  Current Perspectives and Future Prospects, 
 NEDA, 1983.      
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The Philippine labor force has been growing in tandem with overall population 
growth.  The working age population has been growing even faster  about 5.5 percent 
per year between 1967 and 1975 and 3.4 percent per year between 1975 and 1982. The 
labor force participation rate has been about 60 percent while the number employed in the 
labor force continued to remain high. Table 1.4 presents a set of brief labor force data. 
Table I.3
In and Out-Migrants by Region
1970-1975 and 1975-1980
('000)
1970-1973 1970-1973
Region In-Migrants Out-Migrants Not Migrants Out-Migrants In-Migrants Out-Migrants
ALL REGIONS 887.9 887.9 - 1136.9 1136.9 -
NCR 263.0 195.9 67.1 378.9 202.2 (176.7)
I. Ilocos 29.7 70.7 (41.8) 35.6 85.3 (49.7)
II Cagayan Valley 24.1 28.2 (4.1) 33.3 36.0 (2.7)
III Central Luzon 99.2 72.3 25.9 90.5 92.3 (1.0)
IV Southern Tagalog 94.1 73.7 20.4 183.1 113.1 70.0
V Bicol 35.5 67.1 (31.6) 36.9 98.4 (61.5)
VI Western Visayas 39.9 55.8 (15.9) 33.5 104.8 (71.3)
VII Central Visayas 51.1 89.8 (38.7) 51.8 114.2 (62.4)
VIII Eastern Visayas 44.7 49.7 (5.0) 27.6 96.9 (69.3)
IX Western Mindanao 18.0 40.9 (22.9) 20.1 36.9 (8.0)
X Northern Mindanao 81.9 45.9 36.0 92.3 56.5 35.8
XI Southern Mindanao 77.4 49.9 27.5 89.0 61.0 27.2
XII Central Mindanao 29.3 48.8 (10.7) 56.3 38.5 17.8
Source:   NCSO Special Tabulations, 1970, 1975 and 1980 census.
        (Concepcion, M. "The Philippine Population: Trends, Prospects, Problem," 6th 
        National Population Welfare Congress, November 1983).
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TableI.4 
Labor and Employment 
(1967-1982) 
 
 
Year 
Working 
Age 
Population 
(million) 
 
Labor 
Force 
(million) 
Labor Force 
Participation 
Rate 
(percent) 
 
 
Employment 
(million) 
 
1967 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1982 
1983 
 
 
18.3 
20.0 
23.7 
28.0 
30.9 
31.7 
 
 
11.9 
11.6 
14.3 
17.6 
19.2 
20.5 
 
 
65.0 
57.7 
60.3 
62.7 
62.3 
64.6 
 
11.0 
10.7 
13.6 
16.7 
18.3 
19.5 
 
Source: NCSO 
Copied: NEDA 
 
 In general and over a long time period, both labor force and employment have 
been growing at a faster rate than aggregate population. This overall structure has 
therefore remained stable with some yearly fluctuations. 
 The distribution of labor force employment by industry and occupation has not 
changed dramatically in close to three decades of economic growth. Table I.5 shows the 
labor force by major industries. While agricultures share seems to be showings a 
structural (but slow) decline, manufactures share has fluctuated and it is government 
services and commerce which have borne the absorption.  Neither is there a dramatic 
change in the occupation structure of labor for the same period as can be seen from Table 
I.6.  There is a continuous increase among the professional, technical and related workers 
in the same manner as there is a continuous decline among farmers, fishermen and related  
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Table I.5
Distribution of Employment by Industry
(In Percent)
1956 a/ 1961 a/ 1965 a/ 1970 b/ 1975 b/ 1980 c/ 1983 c/
Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry 59.0 60.6 56.7 53.8 53.5 51.4 52.2
Mining and Quarrying 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6
Construction 2.5 2.5 2.9 3.9 3.1 3.6 3.4
Manufacturing 12.5 11.3 10.9 11.9 11.4 11.0 9.6
Electricity, gas and water 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 3.5 0.5
Commerce 10.4 9.6 11.0 7.3 11.2 10.1 11.2
Transportation, storage and communication 3.0 3.0 3.3 4.3 3.4 4.4 4.2
Government 5.1 5.9 7.0 9.8 9.2
Domestic Services 4.3 4.0 4.9 5.4 16.4 1/ 16.5 1/
Personal 1.7 2.8 2.2 6.5 1.9 2.0 1/ 1.8 1/
Net Reported 0.6 0.4 0.5 1.6 0.3 0.0 0.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a/ October Surveys 1/ Community, social and personal services
b/ Census 2/ Financing, insurance, real estate, and business services
3/ 3rd quarter, preliminary figures
Source:NCSO
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agricultural workers. On the other hand, there is no clear increase among craftsmen and 
production process workers. 
 There are naturally wage differentials among the employed by industries as well 
as by occupational structure of the labor force.  The differences in average earnings by 
major occupation group are more transparent than the average wage differentials by 
industry groupings.  For example, using production and related workers as our base 
(100), average earnings range from a lower rate (85)  for service workers and highest for 
administrative, executive and managerial workers (631).  Contrast this with less marked 
disparities by industry wherein, with reference to manufacturing as base (100), the range 
is from employees in construction (96) to financing, insurance, real estate, and business 
services (220). 
 Employment benefits are satisfied by two institutions servicing the private (the 
Social Security System) and the public  (Government Service Insurance System) sectors.  
Table I.6
Distribution of Employment by Occupation
(In Percent)
1956 a/ 1961 a/ 1965 a/ 1970 b/ 1975 b/ 1980 d/ 1983 d/
Professional and technical workers 2.0 3.4 3.7 5.7 5.5 6.4 6.1
Proprietors, Managers and Administration 4.6 3.7 4.3 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.0
Clerical Workers 2.0 3.0 3.5 3.2 3.8 4.5 4.1
Sales Workers 5.9 5.9 6.7 6.8 9.7 10.2 11.0
Farmers, farm laborers, fishermen, 58.7 60.5 56.2 53.1 53.1 51.0 50.9
loggers, and related workers
Workers in mines 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2
Transport workers 1.9 2.0 2.7 4.3 3.4
19.2 18.2
Craftsmen and production process workers 13.9 12.1 12.6 14.4 12.1
Manual workers 2.2 1.0 1.5 2.2 2.2
Service and related workers 7.0 7.0 8.3 7.6 8.6 3.6 8.1
Net Report 0.5 0.3 0.4 1.1 0.2 0.3 4.6
T o t a l 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a, b, d/ See table I.5
c/ August
Source:NCSO
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Benefits provided however are those related to retirement, health, death, and medical 
services and none of unemployment insurance.  Beginning 1975 some additional benefits 
have been given such as rehabilitation services and disability. 
 
1. Income and Income Accounts 
Between 1950 and 1983 the countrys overall gross domestic product (at 1972 
prices) has been growing at an annual average rate of 5.78 percent.  In absolute values 
real GDP stood at P14,830 million in 1950 and P100, 125 million in 1983.  Growth in per 
capita terms however has been slower during the same period (at 2.59 percent per year) 
owing to the high population growth rate. 
In terms of broad sectors (agriculture, fishing and forestry, industrial, and 
service), agricultures real  GDP has been growing at annual averages of 4.40 percent 
along with services at 5.77 percent. The industrial sector however has been growing at 
7.33 percent per year during this long period. 
Table I.7 presents period growth rates for the broad income aggregates while 
Table I.8 shows the sectoral distribution of domestic product. The annual growth rates for 
1946-50 represent a reconstruction phase from World War II such that it  is really the 
period 1950-1983 that one considers a long term pattern. It is to be noted that the growth 
of manufacturing has exceeded that of agriculture within each 5-year interval (with the 
slight exception of 1960-1965). These broad sectoral rates of growth are sometimes made 
the basis for assessing the context of policy regimes. 
It is in Table I.8 that long-term changes in economic structure are perhaps more 
discernable.  From a share to 39 percent of GDP in 1950, agriculture, fishery and forestry 
fell to one-fourth in 1983. Conversely the industrial sectors share increased from 22 
percent (1950) to over 36 percent in 1983. Within industry we find the manufacturing 
sector to have consistently increased its share from about 12 percent to 24 percent while 
construction has fluctuated  throughout the period. There is no clear pattern for the 
services sector. 
The structural change depicted in the tables is not a typical of the experience of 
economic development in general although it simply reflects movements of gross 
domestic products or value added and no specific structural characteristics. 
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2. Industry Characteristics 
From Table I.7 it is seen that the manufacturing sectors growth rate appears to 
have been dynamic over time. An examination of some industrial characteristics would 
reveal that changes have been less dramatic. First, the distribution of value added by 
industry in the sector has basically remained the same. While it has been shown that some 
Table I.7
Average Annual Growth Rates
GNP and Net Domestic Product of Selected Sectors
1946-1983
(In Percent at Constant 1972 Prices)
1946-50  a/ 1950-55 1955-60 1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 b/ 1980-83 b/
Agriculture 12.4 7.0 2.9 4.8 3.5 3.8 5.4 1.5
Manufacturing 5.5 12.1 7.7 4.5 6.1 6.0 7.0 2.5
Services 16.9 9.0 5.0 4.5 4.8 4.8 5.3 3.4
GNP 19.9 7.7 4.9 5.6 4.8 6.5 6.2 2.6
a/
Rates at 1955 prices
b/
Gross value added except GNP
Source:  Baldwin (1975, 3) for 1946-50
          1984 Philippine Statistical Yearbook (NEDA).
Table I.8
INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTION OF DOMESTIC PRODUCT, CY 1950-83
(IN PERCENT, CONSTANT PRICES)
Industry 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983
1. Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry 38.8 37.3 24.4 34.3 32.9 30.8 25.9 24.8
2. Industrial Sector 21.9 21.5 23.4 24.2 24.8 27.6 34.5 35.9
a. Mining and quarrying 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.9 1.9 2.4 2.0
b. Manufacturing 12.5 15.1 17.5 17.2 18.7 19.4 24.6 25.1
c. Construction 7.7 4.6 4.0 5.3 3.6 5.6 7.5 7.7
d. Electricity, gas and water 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.2
3. Service Sector 39.3 41.3 42.2 41.5 42.3 41.6 38.0 39.2
a. Transportation, communication & storage 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.9 5.2 5.3
b. Commerce 23.5 24.0 24.3 23.6 23.7 22.4 20.6 21.6
c. Services 12.8 13.9 14.4 14.5 15.0 15.3 12.2 12.3
NET DOMESTIC PRODUCT 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:  See Table I.7
1950-1975 data are for net domestic product.
1980-1983 data are for gross domestic product.
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marginal structural change occurred, it is not evident from aggregate tables.3  There has 
been fluctuations in the path of industry value added. Table I.9 shows the industry 
distribution from 1948 to 1983.4 Second there is a wide spread of factor proportions used 
among sectors, which spread has increased between 1960 and 1980. For instance the 
difference between minimum and maximum, capital-labor ratio was 47 times in 1960 
rising to over 112 times in 1980. While higher capital labor ratios are associated with 
higher vale added per employee, the latter has grown much  less than the former. Out of 
24 industries only in 6 cases is it that labor productivity has grown faster than capital-
labor ratios. Finally, Hooleys calculations of total factor  productivity growth reveal a 
predominantly negative pattern between 1956 and 1980.5 Table I.10 reports general 
characteristics of manufacturing industries in 1960 and 1980. 
Part of the lack of structural dynamism in Philippine manufacturing is associated 
with adjustments within industries, especially between small and large firms. To the 
extent that large firms are substituting labor for capital in response to shocks (e.g. oil 
price increase) some average productivity declines may be experienced.6  This may have 
been taking place in the seventies.  In general however the persisting import-substituting 
nature of industry has probably prevented a stronger dynamism in manufacturing.  Table 
I.11 shows the ratio of imports to total supplies between 1969 and 1979 reported by Intal.  
It shows that there are as many industries for which the ratios have fallen as there are 
industries for which the reverse is true. 
 
4. Investment and Capital 
Expenditures for gross domestic capital formation and its changes roughly depict a 
picture of the countrys capital structure and real investment.  In the long period 1950-
1983 real gross domestic capital formation (GDCF) has been growing at around 11 
percent per annum.  The major components of this aggregate are fixed capital formation 
(construction by government and the private sector for residential and non-residential 
purposes, durable equipment purchases for machinery other than electric, electric 
machinery/apparatus, and transport equipment) and increases in stocks. 
 
 
 11 
 
 Table I.12 reports a summary of gross domestic capital formation and aggregate 
real saving (persons, corporations, and government) over time, net lending to or 
borrowing from abroad and a ratio of the change in real GDCF (lagged one period) to the 
change in real GDP. 
 Several things are apparent here. One is the higher annual growth rate of GDCF 
of 10 percent and 11.9 percent for the period 1960-1965 and 1970-1975, respectively.  
This is in contrast to the 5.4 percent to 7.7 percent at other periods.  Another is the 
decline in saving as source of GDCF from about 65 percent before 1970 to slightly over 
50 percent after. Of course increased borrowing form abroad took up the slack (the other 
source being capital consumption allowance). Finally the  incremental capital output ratio 
is seen to have perceptibly increased in 1975 from P0.171 per peso output (1960) to 
P0.458. 
 
Table I.9
DISTRIBUTION OF VALUE ADDED BY MANUFACTURING
1940-1983
(IN PERCENT)
Industry 1940 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983
Food, Beverage and Tobacco 60.6 43.3 41.2 40.1 41.8 40.0 43.9 40.0
Textile 2.6 3.7 4.6 4.7 5.9 5.6 4.5 6.1
Footwear and Wearing Apparel 6.6 5.1 3.0 7.0 3.8 3.6 4.4 6.1
Wood and Cork Products 9.7 5.0 4.0 4.6 4.2 2.8 2.9 3.6
Furniture and Fixtures 1.0 1.3 0.9 1.4 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.5
Paper and Paper Products 0.0 1.7 2.3 2.1 2.9 2.9 0.8 1.2
Publishing and Printing 3.7 3.1 3.2 4.1 2.2 2.7 1.4 1.0
Leather and Leather Products 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
Rubber Products 0.6 0.9 3.2 2.9 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.2
Chemical and Chemical Products 2.9 9.9 10.0 9.1 7.9 13.1 16.1 7.6
Non-metallic Mineral Products 2.1 4.7 3.7 4.4 4.2 3.6 2.5 2.6
Basic Metal and Metal Products 1.9 4.7 0.0 0.5 7.4 6.0 0.2 6.2
Machinery 0.5 2.1 4.2 4.8 4.5 3.8 8.1 6.8
Transport 1.0 2.2 2.2 2.0 4.2 5.1 3.8 1.8
Miscellaneous Manufactures 5.7 11.2 8.2 5.2 8.7 8.7 1.1 1.5
T O T A L 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:  Bautista, Power and Associates (1979) for 1948-1965.
             1983 Philippine Statistical Yearbook (1983).
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TABLE I. 10
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS
1960 1980 TFP
Code Industry Group FA/L VA/L FA/L VA/L 1956-00
311/312 Food 6.52 9.00 76.91 51.85 0.011
313 Beverage 5.41 15.20 86.23 102.41 0.009
314 Tobacco 2.70 6.53 21.06 132.03 0.009
321 Textiles 6.99 4.17 61.62 29.22 -0.007
322 Wearing apparel except footwear 1.33 2.44 8.84 a/ 14.23 a/ 0.014
323 Leather and leather products 4.01 4.78 21.90 10.74 -0.024
324 Footwear 1.40 2.55 12.43 11.01 0.000
331 Wood Products 4.77 4.01 35.81 97.90 0.006
332 Furniture and Fixtures 1.75 2.72 10.53 12.70 -0.025
341 Paper and Products 14.12 10.11 125.16 77.68 -0.007
342 Printing/Publishing 3.61 5.29 39.14 32.20 0.008
351 Industrial Chemicals 17.56 7.02 164.30 210.60 -0.004
352 Other Chemicals 6.29 16.72 45.24 100.77 0.000
353 Petroleum Refineries 62.62 b/ 132.18 b/ 402.12 1449.11 -0.082
355 Rubber Products 9.35 11.27 36.70 56.77 -0.003
356 Plastic Products 4.72 6.04 34.20 33.09 0.001
362 Glass Products 8.54 9.77 62.74 40.54 -0.032
364 Other Non-Metallic 12.97 8.76 114.07 61.74 -0.010
371 Iron and Steel Basic 9.34 7.84 102.68 247.45 0.002
372 Non-Ferous Metal 6.77 6.77 38.04 63.09 -0.046
381 Fabricated Metals 0.06 7.56 23.45 20.70 -0.006
382 Machinery 4.95 9.07 37.99 31.14 0.039
383 Electrical Machinery 4.17 8.40 22.79 42.12 0.012
384 Transport Equipment 4.95 9.07 56.37 63.60
a/  Estimated by Hooley (1984).
b/  1962.
FA/L -- value of fixed assets per total employees in thousand current pesos.
VA/L -- census value added per total employees in thousand current pesos.
Source of Basic Data: Hooley (1984).
*Hooley, 1984.
 13 
 
 
TABLE I.11
RATIO IMPORT TO TOTAL SUPPLIES
(IN PERCENT)
Industry 1969 1979
Beverages 2.41 2.29
Tobacco products 7.98 0.22
Textile manufactures 40.25 18.04
Wearing apparel 2.62 0.43
Lumber 0.06 0.10
Other wood and cork products 1.98 0.99
Furniture and paper products 24.35 22.99
Publishing and printing 13.78 12.65
Leather and leather products 4.43 46.55
Rubber products 12.86 11.77
Coconut and other oils and fats 12.68 0.34
Basic industrial chemicals 25.04 30.00
Petroleum refineries, etc. 6.41 11.38
Cement 1.67 1.06
Non-metallic mineral products 19.82 15.24
Basic metal 52.14 37.23
Metal products 23.71 18.97
Machinery except electrical 3.55 69.58
Electrical machinery 27.90 55.26
Transport equipment 20.06 51.77
Miscellaneous manufactures and scrap 9.04 35.71
Electricity, gas and water services 0.47 0.00
Construction 0.18 0.30
Source:  Intal (1985).
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 The capital formation in manufacturing is shown in Table I.13.  What is striking 
about these figures is clearly the high ratio of the increase in fixed assets to the increase 
in gross value added of the sector, even more so for the increment in 1970-1975.  When 
the real decline in manufacturing gross value added between 1975 and 1980 is taken into 
account it is quite obvious that factor productivity must have been declining, and in 
general the overall productivity growth of the sector since 1960.  While long term gross 
domestic investment was increasing, we find that commensurate output was not 
forthcoming efficiently. 
 
6.  Trade and Balance of Payments 
Philippine trade is characterized by a long-term pattern of persistent trade deficit.  
In the period 1950-1983, only in 3 years has the trade balance shown a surplus (1959,  
TABLE I.12
GROSS DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORMATION INDICATORS
(1972 PRICES)
1950-1983
Lending/(borrowing) GDCF
GDCF Savings Abroad GDP
(million pesos) (million pesos) (million pesos) (million pesos)
1950 2,632 2,727 875 -
1955 3,838 2,282 (460) -
1960 5,173 3,532 120 0.171
1965 8,336 5,751 379 0.223
1970 10,835 6,105 (764) 0.193
1975 18,984 9,745 (3,103) 0.458
1980 26,609 14,098 (4,460) 0.338
1983 25,029 9,310 (6,237) 1.018
1984 15,462 4,054 (2,835)
a/  advance estimate
Source of Basic Data:  NEDA, Philippine Statistical Yearbook (various years).
 15 
1963 and 1973).  Although the current account balance has also been in deficit over the 
long term, it has had more years of surplus (7 years between 1950-1983) than the trade 
account. 
 
 
 Exports have always been concentrated and ten products, mostly unprocessed or 
raw, accounted for more than 80 percent of total exports since the beginning of Philippine 
Trade.  The products are copra, sugar, bananas, logs, lumber, desiccated coconut, coconut 
oil, abaca, copper concentrate and gold. 
  The strength of these ten principal exports in the total has been fairly stable and 
it is only in the mid-seventies that their share fell below 70 percent of exports. What has 
emerged in this last decade is an increasing share or non-traditional manufactured 
exports, composed mostly of labor-intensive tradeables. 
 The change in the structure of exports is not only between principal and non-
traditional manufactures but even within the principal ones as more processing has taken 
place.  For instance within coconut product exports one finds an increased share of 
coconut oil from copra, desiccated coconut or copra meal.  One finds a better balance 
TABLE I.13
VALUE OF FIXED ASSETS AND GROSS VALUE ADDED
PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING: 1956-1980
(1972 PRICES)
FA-1
Fixed Assets Gross Value Added GVA
(million pesos) (million pesos) (pesos)
1956 1,910.8 1,885.2 -
1960 3,139.1 3,030.4 -
1965 6,141.6 3,896.8 1.42
1970 10,438.8 6,180.0 1.31
1975 14,396.9 7,563.0 3.11
1980 21,120.5 7,542.5 -
Source of Basic Data:  Hooley (1984).
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among logs, lumber and plywood among forest products exports.  On the other hand, 
concentration can also be detected among exports of non-traditional manufactures in 2 or 
3 products (electrical and electronic equipment and components, garments, and 
handicrafts). 
 Table I.14 presents the pattern of the exports of ten principal product groups 
between 1950 and 1983.  The share began dramatically to fall from 1974 when 70.6 
percent of exports were still concentrated on ten principal products. 
  
 
The historical growth (1950-1980) of exports has been at the real rate of about 10 
percent per year.  There are variations in this growth pattern within this long stretch with 
slow rates in the fifties and dynamic surges in the seventies.  Table I.15 shows a summary 
of major balance of payments components including trade balance and overall current 
account transactions. 
 Imports have historically grown at 10.7 percent per year in real terms and were 
initially concentrated on consumer goods imports. Import controls in the fifties curtailed 
TABLE I.14
EXPORT AND IMPORT STRUCTURE
1950-1983
Export Structure Import Structure
Share (percent of Share (percent of
10 Principal) Consumer Intermediate Capital
Exports Others Goods Goods Goods
1950 85.3 14.6 90.9 a
1955 80.4 19.6 21.1 58.1 20.8
1960 89.1 10.9 16.0 45.0 39.0
1965 79.5 20.5 22.1 40.9 37.0
1970 76.0 24.0 10.8 47.6 41.6
1975 70.5 29.5 15.9 52.5 31.6
1980 45.5 54.5 18.4 55.9 25.7
1983 34.6 65.44 22.5 54.0 23.5
a/ 1952.
Source:  NEDA, Philippine Statistical Yearbook (1984).
 17 
the inflow of non-essential goods such that by 1955 the share of consumer goods 
imports to total imports fell to 21.1 percent.  Since then this share has remained at about a 
fifth of all imports.  The rest are divided between capital goods and intermediate goods 
imports. Between 1950 and 1983 however the latter has had higher shares to the total. 
 
 
 
 Returning  now to Tables I.14 and I.15 we can see that a continuing deficit in the 
trade balance has been a normal experience for the country although it is really in the 
early seventies (1970-1975) that the deficits accelerated, which is from US$17 million to 
US$1.2 billion. The gradual increase in the services and transfer accounts hides an 
important dimension to the balance of payments.  This is the role of remittances from the 
export of Philippine labor in the seventies.  On the imports side this has come from 
interest payments for accumulated debts, repartriation and related outflows.  In the 1970 
earnings from exports of  services accounted for 15.6 percent of merchandise exports 
whereas in 1983 this formed almost 60 percent of physical exports.  For imports the 
importance of services did not accelerate that much.  All these are evident from Table 
I.16. 
TABLE I.15
PHILIPPINE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(US DOLLARS)
1950-1983
Trade Services and Current Account Basic
Exports Imports Balance Transfer Balance Balance
(M $) (M $) (M $) (M $) (M $) (M $)
1950 333 356 (23)
1955 419 536 (117) (12) (129)
1960 535 624 (89) 85 (4)
1965 796 835 (39) 162 123
1970 1,142 1,159 (17) (31) (49) 54
1975 2,294 3,459 (1,165) 261 (904) (421)
1980 5,788 7,727 (1,939) (107) (2,046) (947)
1983 5,005 7,487 (2,482) (225) (2,707) (1,276)
Source:  Central Bank of the Philippines, Statistical Bulletin (various years).
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 In summary the acceleration of trade deficits has been partly cushioned by the 
strength of services exports and thus contributing to a more moderate current account 
balance deficit, at least until the middle of the seventies.7 
 
B. Description of A Long-Term Policy Pattern 
1.   Introduction 
This description of a long-term policy pattern uses several commercial and 
financial indicators to discern the degree or restriction or liberalization followed by the 
country.  At this level or generalization we will not detail the explicit process (if any) 
TABLE I.16
EXPORTS (FOB) AND IMPORTS (FOB) OF GOODS AND SERVICES
(MILLION US DOLLARS)
1970-1983
Exports Imports
Goods Services Goods Services
1970 1,142 178 1,159 331
1971 1,189 212 1,186 352
1972 1,168 285 1,260 193
1973 1,837 688 1,597 638
1974 2,725 834 3,143 868
1975 2,294 907 3,459 952
1976 2,574 871 3,633 1,131
1977 3,151 1,085 3,915 1,333
1978 3,424 1,414 4,732 1,591
1979 4,601 1,576 6,142 1,966
1980 5,788 2,222 7,727 2,621
1981 5,722 2,896 7,946 3,205
1982 5,020 2,984 7,667 3,944
1983 5,005 2,990 7,487 3,614
Source:  IMF, International Financial Statistics (various years),
             Central Bank of the Philippines
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pursued in increasing or decreasing protection accorded the economy.  Our purpose is 
rather to highlight particular waves of liberalization which are to be the basis for further 
elaboration and study. 
There is an abundance of studies on trade and development in the Philippines.  In 
particular, Power and Sicat (1971), Baldwin (1975) and Bautista, Power and Associates 
(1979) provide comprehensive accounts of trade regimes, protective effects, resource 
allocation consequences and industrial incentives.  In addition there are other studies on 
tariff reforms and liberalization.8 
It is perhaps accepted by Philippine trade scholars that (a) the decontrol program 
in 1962 while liberalizing commercial exchange, effectively activated a protective tariff 
code (enacted in 1957 during a period of exchange controls) which somehow retained the 
same bias as the control era, (b) the effective protection structure in 1965 remained 
basically the same as 1974,9 (c) the 1973 tariff code (Presidential Decree / PD 34) 
retained the same protection structure as 1957, except for classification realignment with 
Central Bank procedure,  and simplified the number of tariff rates as well as narrowed the 
boundaries, (d) the 1970 Export Incentives Act (Republic Act 6135) added a trade 
promoting element to an earlier investment incentives program (Republic Act 5186), and 
(e) the tariff reform of 1980 was fundamental program towards lower effective protection 
rates (EPR) and uniform tariff across industries. 
Our interest  however is in understanding a long-term pattern of protection and 
liberalization and their processes of sequencing and timing. Thus while intermittent 
measures of them are useful, it is the use of consistency measures that we want to track.  
Ideally a long series of EPR estimates can yield indications of the degree of liberalization 
over time. For example, Baldwin estimated yearly EPRs for different categories of goods 
from 1950 to 1971. We have extended his series until 1980 and present them as Figure I.1 
according to three categories of goods (import substituting manufactures, new exports 
and traditional exports). However since our primary interest in this part is an overall 
measure of protection, we are using more aggregative indices. But the pattern of the 
yearly EPRs has been taken into account in the next section. Alternatively to the extent 
that we can, following through specific policy tools that dictate commercial trade 
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behavior (e.g. tariff and non-tariff measures, border taxes, quantitative restrictions etc.) 
can indicate a pattern of protection and liberalization. 
Short of these, one can examine a set of price structures that would tend to 
influence trade behavior. Indeed in some cases prices become the more effective 
determinants, as illustrated for example when tariffs are inoperative in the presence of 
quantitative restrictions. Here tariff-based EPR estimates will not likely capture the 
protective element from the discretionary policy of licensing or quantitative restrictions. 
  
2. Some Liberalization Indicators 
Point estimates of EPR are available for 1985, 1974 and 1979 (preliminary), since 
these are the years for which transactions matrices were gathered.  Adjusted input-output 
data are available for other years (1969, 1978) but since there have been no major 
changes in tariff rates, the EPR  estimates for the 3 years can indicate direction of 
effective protection. 
 Because of varying coverage, levels of aggregation and sectoral classification, 
EPR estimates are not directly comparable across these three time periods.  Nevertheless 
attempts wee made to (a) arrive at common items and their unweighted and weighted 
average EPRs derived, (b) consider  a narrower set of products for comparisons between 
1965 and 1974 as well as between 1974 and 1979, and (c) discern the spread of EPRs.  
Table I.17 presents EPRs by end-use.  Notice the decline in consumption  goods EPRS 
between 1974 and 1979, larger than the decline in intermediate goods.  On the other hand 
adjustments made to allow greater comparability between 1965 and 1974 and between 
1974 and 1979 reveal that there have only been slight movements in protection 
(excluding capital goods and inputs into construction).  The sharp reduction in 
unweighted average EPR for consumption goods in 1979 is compensated in part by a rise 
in unweighted average EPRs for intermediate goods, inputs into construction and capital 
goods such that the overall change in protection may have only been marginal (as 
revealed in Figure I.1). 
The EPRs of the various input-output sectors were weighted by the 1974 share of 
sectoral value added to the manufacturing total to arrive at weighted means. The 
movements of the weighted EPRs follow the same general pattern for the simple means, 
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noted earlier.  However when adjustments were made to allow comparatibility of sectors 
for different years, there are noticeable differences in the weighted EPRs. 
 Between 1965 and 1974 the weighted mean EPR for consumption goods almost 
doubled in comparison with the slight movement of the simple EPR. Between the same 
periods, the weighted mean EPR for intermediate goods fell by a half. These two 
comparative measures suggest there may have only been a slight overall change in the 
protection to the economy between 1965 and 1974. 
 There is also a noticeable narrowing of EPR variabilities between 1965 and 1979 
especially for consumer goods and intermediate products. Thus while changes occurred 
in the levels of protection especially between 1974 and 1979 the direction seems to have 
been some narrowing of the differentials according to end-use and thus on the pattern of 
import substitution.10 
 Exchange rate policies affect the official exchange rates by which commercial 
transactions take place. There are at least two ways by which this will indicate the 
relative degree of liberalization: (a) by either narrowing or widening the gap between 
official rates and parallel black market rates and (b) by the frequency with which 
exchange rates move relative to the movement of the trading partners exchange rates.  
The former can be measured by the ratio of black market to official rates while the latter 
can either be computed as a nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) or real effective 
exchange rate (REER), as shown as 
       Σ (mij / m i) r j 
     j ≠1 
  NERi  = ____________ 
      r i 
    
       Σ (mij / m i) r j  /Pj 
      j≠1 
  RERi  = ____________ 
      r i P i 
 
where і and j are country indices,  r is the number of  units of domestic currency per U.S. 
dollar, mij    is imports from  j  by  і  and  P is  the wholesale price index. 
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TABLE I.17
EFFETIVE RATES OF PROTECTION BY END-USE
Consumption Bonds Intermediate Bonds
1965 1974 1979 1985 1965 1974 1979 1985
Number of Items 43 56 69 31 23 35 42 14
Simple Mean (%) 57.08 180.02 88.00 43.10 45.48 35.71 46.60 12.63
Standard Deviation 236.97 507.77 123.54 40.20 103.22 67.00 42.07 14.31
Coefficient of Variation 4.16 2.70 1.39 1.12 2.27 1.30 0.90 1.13
  Weighted Mean (%) 29.28 163.44 65.58 62.69 7.22 19.94 24.87 7.58
  Number of Items 24 32 44 30 11 17 10 14
Adjusted for 1955 and 1974
Number of Items 20 20 14 10
Simple Mean (%) 73 89.8 51.56 32.39
Standard Deviation 203.06 139.44 130.14 77.17
Coefficient of Variation 2.79 1.57 2.52 2.38
  Weighted Mean (%) 7.05 14 10.03 5.65
  Number of Items 11 11 10 10
Adjusted for 1974 and 1979
Number of Items 49 49 35 35
Simple Mean (%) 191.3 165 35.71 43.97
Standard Deviation 539.8 140.9 67.83 41.67
Coefficient of Variation 2.02 1.34 1.96 0.95
  Weighted Mean (%) 48 60.69 18.69 31.64
  Number of Items 27 27 15 15
Inputs into Construction Capital Goods
1965 1974 1979 1985 1965 1974 1979 1985
Number of Items 16 21 22 14 4 7 7 7
Simple Mean (%) 80.44 20 61.36 24.74 22 19.06 67.56 19.61
Standard Deviation 102.38 64.82 62.97 26.45 25.73 11.3 83.43 8.5
Coefficient of Variation 1.27 1.35 1.03 1.07 1.17 0.57 1.23 0.43
  Weighted Mean (%) -15.05 14.51 6.07 19.92 5 17.17 37.61 21.96
  Number of Items 8 15 15 14 1 7 7 7
Adjustment Discarding Logging
  Weighted Mean (%) 18.46 44.36 43.26 19.92
  Number of Items 7 14 14 14
Source:  1965: Power, John H. "The Structure of Protection in the Philippines" in The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries, 
ed. By Dela Balanca & Associates, 1971.
              1974: Bautista R., Power J., & Associates. Industrial Promotion Policies in the Philippines, PIDS, 1979.
              1979: Tariff Commission Estimation.
              1980: Bautista Romeo M. "The 1981-85 Tariff Changes and Effective Protection of Manufacturing
Industries," Journal of Philippine Development VIII (1981).
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Two aggregate measures of the degrees of liberalization are (a) an implicit 
import premium which includes  the effects of quota and tariffs, and  (b)  a ratio of the 
prices of tradeables to non-tradeables. We have simply derived the former as the ratio of 
the wholesale price index of imported goods to the import unit price index (both in peso 
terms).  Power and Sicat has used this as a good indicator or trends in the implicit degree 
of protection provided by the control system. 11   
The latter on the other hand has been proxied by the ratio of the wholesale price 
index (WPI) to the consumer price index (CPI). The basket of goods in CPI tends to 
emphasize the menu consumed by low income groups which are generally non-tradeable 
goods.  In the WPI are tradables (i.e. importable).  Thus trends in the ratio would show 
the domestic prices of tradables relative to non-tradedables (even though the latter goods 
prices may be subject to price controls).12 
There may be ad hoc restrictions that may be applied temporarily that would be 
product specific or across all trade transactions. In the Philippine context what would 
induce these measures to be taken are balance of payments problems. Deterioration in the 
current account balance obviously triggers immediate restrictions to imports or 
surcharges to exchange transactions that would have a direct bearing on the ability to 
carry on trade.  Perhaps the more relevant information is the current account balance or 
the previous periods deficit before quantitative measures are taken. 
In recent  years (from about 1975) it is our impression that non-tariff barriers have 
increased dramatically at the same time that exemptions from duties mushroomed for 
either favored industries or firms.  The former had led to greater restrictions while the 
latter, though distortionary, is less restrictive. 
 
3. An Index of Trade Liberalization 
 The complete decontrol of the Philippine economy in 1962 (and the unification of 
the exchange rate in 1965) is probably the most important single act to free international 
trade transactions from the discretion of the control era.  Thus in spite of the protective 
nature of the ensuing tariff structure that became  operational, decontrol by itself was a 
form of liberalization.  Put differently, the substitution of a price-dominated protection 
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system over a maze of controls was less restrictive.  Baldwin has adequately documented 
the regime of complete liberalization as occurring from 1965 to 1967, after which 
controls were gradually reimposed following balance of payments deterioration. 
 In February, 1970, the exchange rate was allowed  to float and simultaneously 
some of the earlier restrictions lifted. The commercial policy however remained basically  
the same except that on the one hand controls on less essential consumer goods imports 
were retained and, on the other hand, export promotion was actively pursued. In one 
sense the latter was another form or liberalization in as much as the trade policy regime 
had an export bias. The commodity boom in 1973-74 allowed a further degree or 
liberalization. 
 A major revision to the 1957 tariff code was made in 1973. The revisions 
however were marginal rather than structural, e.g. simplification by setting a maximum 
rate of 100 percent ad valorem and a minimum of 10 percent and providing for six levels 
of rates (10, 20, 30, 50, 70 and 100), special duties to protect Philippine industries against 
dumping or subsidy, and institutionalization of the export tax.  The Tariff and Customs 
Code of 1978 had likewise marginal modifications.  Thus between 1957 and 1978 there 
was very minimal structural changes in the tariff. 
 The operating mechanism for the degree of liberalization between 1970 and 1979 
was embodied in various circulars, administrative orders, and decrees which imposed 
either restrictions or exemptions.  The continuing trend of deficits in the current account 
balance necessitated fragmented and non-transparent restriction. 
 A major tariff reform program was designed in 1980 and implemented in 1981.  
Along with this was an import liberalization effort to free from restrictions items 
classified as non-essentials, banned and unclassified. The 1963 economic crisis, however, 
effectively aborted these fundamental changes in tariff structure and commercial policy 
in the country. 
 This abbreviated description of a long-term liberalization policy pattern is 
represented graphically in Figure I.2. Although the index is numerical it should more or 
less be seen as an ordinal specification of the degree of liberalization in the period 1960-
1983, 0 representing a least literal and 20 representing a most liberal policy. The 
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numerical magnitudes are judgmental, based as far as possible on the objective indicators 
explained in the previous section and shown in Table I.18. 
 Notice the steep acceleration of liberalization between 1960 and 1962 after which 
the freeing of commercial trade at the fringes until 1965 leveled the degree of 
liberalization.  The ad hoc measures in 1968 and 1969 increased protection until the 
floating of the rate in 1970.  The fundamental tariff reform in 1981 is evident as a rise in 
the index, while the reimposition of import and foreign exchange controls in 1982 and 
1983 induces a downturn in the index. 
 The current account balance column in Table I.18  has been lagged by one year.  
It shows positive balances from 1964-1967 after which it deteriorates.  Improvements are 
then seen from 1971-1974.  This follows our rough index of quantitative restrictions. 
 On the other hand the ratio of the black market to official exchange rates shows a 
pattern not too dissimilar from Figures I.1 (see Figure I.3).  The real effective exchange 
rate and the quota premium on imports series are shown in Figures I.4 and I.5 
respectively.  The index for REER is based on May 1970, 3 months after the floating of 
the Philippine peso. 
 The general picture that emerges from this is three episodes of liberalization: (a) 
the first resulting from the 1962 decontrol,  (b)  the floating of the exchange rate in 1970 
and export promotion, and (c) the tariff reform and import liberalization in 1981.  
Although these many not all reflect changes in commercial policy or even deliberate 
policy designs, the environment over this long period suggests the degrees of 
liberalization we outlined. 
 These episodes constitute the bases for our detailed study of their timing and 
sequencing. 
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TABLE I.18
SELECTED LIBERALIZATION INDICATORS
1960-1983
"Implicit Import
NER a/ RER b/ Premium" CAB d/ IR e/ BR f/ WPI g/
OR CPI
Year (1970=100) (1970=100) (1970=100) (million US$) (million US$) (1970=100)
1960 305.5 210.8 232.0 56 90.0 1.29 101.8
1961 305.0 218.3 240.4 -4 120.0 1.18 101.8
1962 166.3 121.0 135.1 -66 44.1 1.05 104.1
1963 157.8 127.8 133.2 -30 75.0 1.01 105.5
1964 157.9 132.4 132.8 182 109.5 1.00 101.6
1965 157.9 133.4 131.1 85 123.3 1.03 100.5
1966 158.3 136.1 129.4 123 188.5 1.02 100.0
1967 157.5 136.5 126.3 147 166.1 1.05 97.3
1968 157.9 137.7 126.3 -42 179.8 1.59 97.8
1969 157.5 134.5 127.0 -266 161.4 1.27 97.7
1970 103.4 103.7 110.1 -253 120.7 1.12 105.2
1971 93.8 107.1 103.4 -48 251.0 1.09 105.8
1972 84.9 103.8 100.0 -2 375.5 1.05 100.0
1973 79.0 108.1 89.5 4 548.8 1.06 106.4
1974 80.7 142.7 83.3 473 1037.0 1.05 116.9
1975 75.9 129.4 89.8 -207 1502.5 1.09 115.3
1976 75.3 129.4 94.7 -904 1360.6 1.06 114.0
1977 72.8 130.2 88.3 -1105 1641.7 1.05 112.7
1978 66.2 124.6 90.9 -820 1525.1 1.07 109.9
1979 66.5 134.6 95.3 -1162 1882.7 1.08 111.3
1980 66.5 135.5 80.1 -1562 2422.9 1.07 111.3
1981 68.6 137.4 -2046 3155.4 1.05 111.3
1982 73.1 142.5 -2327 2707.0 1.06 111.5
1983 73.1 127.3 -3360 2542.7 1.27 124.0
  Σ (mij / m i) r j
a/ NERi = j ?1 , see text for definition
        r i
 Σ (mij / m i) r j  /Pj
b/ RERi =  j?1
r i P i , see text for definition
c/
Define as the ratio of wholesale price index for imported goods (in peso prices) to the units price index
for imports (in pesos prices).
d/
Current Account Balance the previous year.
e/
International Reserves the previous year.
f/
Black market rate divided by official rate of exchange.
g/
Ratio of wholesale price index to consumer price index.
Sources:
a, b       - computed by P. Rana (Asian Development Bank)
c           - Central Bank of the Philippines
d           - Central Bank of the Philippines
e           - IMF, International Financial Statistics
f            - Dick's Currency Yearbook (various issues)
Central Bank of the Philippines
g           - Central Bank of the Philippines and NEDA, Yearbook of Philippine Statistics (various years).
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FOOTNOTES
                                                 
1 In Baldwin (1975), a comparison is made between the Philippines and Korea in terms of population (p. 2) 
in 1971.  Yet what was not covered in his comparisons is the fact that in 1970 the manufacturing sectors 
share to GDP was roughly comparable  23.1 percent for the Philippines and 18 percent for Korea.  In 1980 
the ratios were reversed  23 percent for the Philippines and 33.2 percent for Korea. 
 
2The World Bank continues to classify the country among those with high population growth rate such that 
the premature leveling of the annual rate at 2.75 percent is considered to pose a drag to growth. 
 . 
3 Although calculations of an index of structural change are sensitive to periods chosen, one estimate 
indicates a sharp increase from the period 1987-70 to 1975  80.  See Alburo (1984). 
 
4The industries included in the calculation combines a number of important industries (e.g. food, beverage 
and tobacco) and excludes others (e.g. petroleum) 
 
5 The measure of total factor productivity growth is the usual residual that comes with differentiation of 
aggregate production function with respect to time.  See Hooley (1985). 
 
6 Alburo (1984). 
 
7 In precise terms this has only been true because services exports had a low base to begin with.  What is 
apparent form Table I.16  is that only in 1972 and 1973 did the country experience a services account 
surplus. 
 
8 For instance, Bautista (1985). 
 
9Tan (1970). 
 
10 This observation which is not striking in Bautistas estimates of EPRs based on the 1974 I-O tables,  
confirms an earlier observation by Alburo about narrowing of EPRs with different {a }s due to the 
external disturbances leading to differential factor price movements.  See Bautista (1982) and Alburo 
(1982). 
 
11Power and Sicat (1971), p. 35. 
 
12Relative prices are considered effective signals for resource flows.  Since the price-controlled items are 
for food and basic necessities, these have  been effectively institutionalized since the period of controls and 
therefore do not confer wild fluctuations to the series. 
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PART II 
 
NOTES ON THE FIRST EPISODE: FOREIGN EXCHANGE DECONTROL 1960-651 
 
1. Introduction of the Policy 
 
Foreign exchange controls had been introduced as a balance-of-payments measure 
in 1949 (at a time when post-independence treaty obligations with the US prevented the 
Philippines from unilaterally changing the exchange rate of P2 = $1). Their unintended 
effect was to encourage a rush of import-substituting  investment in the early 1950s. The 
foreign exchange control system was based from 1953 onwards in the Central Bank 
which allocated foreign exchange according to a classification of goods by use 
(producer or consumer) and degree of essentiality, the less essential consumer 
goods having the lowest import priority and thus providing the greatest incentives for 
import  substitution investment. With changes of classification of products this same list 
has continued to serve as a bible to the Central Bank, except in the period of full 
decontrol, 1962-69, and, to an extent, after the liberalization of 1981-83. 
It is hardly surprising that the system of protection should make the Peso 
progressively more overvalued in the 1950s, discouraging exports (in the face of the 
industrial sectors appetite for foreign exchange). Moreover, it is not surprising that the 
import allocation system should have led to substantial corruption. One indicator of the 
overvaluation is the black-market premium (ratio of black-market to official exchange 
rate) which moved from 1.30-1.50 in the first half of the 1950s to 2.01 by 1959 (the going 
rate for the purchase of import licenses is said to have moved, as one might expect, by 
similar magnitudes). 
By 1959 reserves were severely depleted and there was simply no more room for 
maneuver in cutting imports.  The political fight for decontrol had been waged in earnest 
since around 1957.  Its major proponents were the export sector,  particularly the 
powerful sugar lobby, which was well represented in Congress.  Resisting the move was 
the Garcia Administration (Naciolista Party) which placed great emphasis on the role of 
controls in industrialization.  The sugar lobby was not very popular  its power and 
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evident self interest were resented--, hence economic issues were clouded with political 
equity issues in the debate.  In the event, it was this Administration which undertook the 
first phase of decontrol.  This it did rather reluctantly and cautiously. 
This consisted in a planned effective devaluation through the means of a multiple 
exchange rate to start in April, 1960, and to culminate in a unified devalued exchange 
rate not later than 1964.  The first three stages of this plan saw a gradual increase in the 
amount of transactions taking place at the so-called free rate (a rate actually fixed by 
the Central Bank).  In the first phase, from April to November, 1960, about one-quarter 
of all foreign exchange transactions occurred at the free-rate of P3.00.  In the second 
phase, from November, 1960, to March, 1961, about half of these transactions occurred at 
the free rate; from March, 1961, to January, 1962, in the third phase, about three-quarters 
of such transactions took place at P3.00.  While the steps taken under the tree stages 
represented a partial devaluation, the import liberalization was less:  the Central Bank 
still effectively controlled import allocation. 
For the November, 1961, presidential election, Diosdado Macapagal, the Liberal 
Party candidate, made an acceleration of decontrol one of his important planks(but, 
interestingly, the appeal was perhaps more to the elimination of graft than the promotion 
of efficient resource allocation).  His stance on decontrol may have won him the support 
of the US government in the election. One of his first steps on assuming office in 
January, 1962, was to completely decontrol of imports, letting the Peso float, while 
exports were to face a temporary retention of 20% of foreign exchange earnings at the 
P2.00 rate.  By mid 1962 the exchange rate had settled at P3.9, where it was held until 
1970.  The January decontrol was also accompanied by the realignment of some tariffs in 
a conscious move to protect manufactures from some of the effects of decontrol (already 
in 1957 a reform of tariffs had made them considerably more protective), not so much 
perhaps in preparation for decontrol as to capture a larger share of the import quota 
premium for the government.  The intended removal of the 20% retention on exports 
finally occurred in November, 1965, thus reconstituting a unified exchange rate. 
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2.  Economic Performance following Decontrol 
 
The complete dismantling of foreign exchange controls was achieved over a 21-
month period (April, 1960, to January, 1962).  Inspite of the tariff rises of 1957 and 1962 
to cushion the impact on industry of decontrol, the (imperfect) evidence suggests a very 
large fall in the protective premium on imports, concentrated in 1961 and 1962, the 
virtually complete elimination of the black-market premium, and a large fall in the 
implicit degree of nominal protection to industry (see table below). 
 
It is difficult to infer the effect on effective protection, for nominal protection to 
both outputs and inputs must have been slashed by the removal of quota premia.  
However, the poor performance of manufacturing in the post-decontrol period (see 
below) does imply a loss of effective protection. 
Especially by the standards of the 1970 devaluation episode, post-decontrol price 
rises, though high by historical standard, were modest (a 22% rise in the CPI from 1959 
to 1963).  But this was enough to reduce real wages by about 10% in 1959-63 and lead to 
significant labor unrest in 1963, and a rise in minimum wages in 1966 that restored part 
of the real loss.  The modesty of deflation and the extent of real devaluation combined to 
achieve a substantial improvement in real effective exchange rates for imports and 
Price Indices (1959 = 100)
Unit Price Wholesale Price of Ratio of
of Imports Price Domestic Black-market
(In Pesos) of Imports Manufactures to Official Rate
1959 100 100 100 2.01
1960 107 a 106 103 1.29
1961 151 a 111 110 1.18
1962 202 122 115 1.05
1963 217 129 120 1.01
1964 220 130 126 1.00
  a/Converted at estimated weighted import (multiple) exchange rate of 2.09 in
1960, 2.92 in 1961.
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exports, as measured by the ratio of the CPI to unit prices of imports and exports in Pesos 
(see the following table, 1959=100): 
 
 
Three important effects of decontrol on the economy are worth stressing.  First, as 
far as the external position went, there was a large increase in  export quantities from 
1962 (when there was a considerable improvement in the export exchange rate) to 1966 
(NB taking into account exports outside official channels, it appears that the real growth 
began in 1959). Export expansion concentrated on a small number of product groups, 
sugar, coconut, logs and mining. There was also some growth, though at a lower rate 
until after 1966, of manufactured export.  The restrained growth of imports from 1959 to 
1963 contributed to the restoration of a positive balance-of-payments current account in 
1963-66. After 1963 there was a rapid increase in import volume which, together with a 
steady (if unspectacular) decline in the terms of trade, led to high balance-of-payments 
deficits by 1968 and 1969. 
 
Second, the success of export agriculture led to a shift in land use from food to 
export crops, particularly sugar, in the early-to-mid 1960s (according to Treadgold and 
Hooley, 1967).  This led to higher food prices (especially rice up to 1966), fed into the 
CPI Real Wage REER Imports REER Exports
1959 100 100 100 100
1960 105 101 103 107
1961 110 97 106 121
1962 113 95 56 72
1963 122 89 56 68
1964 133 86 61 71
1965 137 88 61 72
1966 144 92 63 75
1967 152 93 65 78
1968 155 91 61 75
1969 157 94 60 76
  a/ The use of the official exchange rate (rather then the weighted multiple exchange
rate) leads to an overstatement of the height of the REER.
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consumer price index, and helped in the real wage decline. (Rice was one of the few 
products in the post-decontrol period not to be freely traded). This aspect of the post-
decontrol experience may have helped convince the incoming Marcos Administration in 
1960 of the need for a rural development program. 
Third, while the decontrol had a salutary effect on the external position of the 
economy in 1962-66, the positive effect on growth was less obvious.  In particular the jolt 
to manufacturing, was serious. Manufacturing GDP growth averaged 7.7% in 1957-59;  
this figure fell to 3.7% in 1960-65 (there is also some corresponding evidence of falling 
profit rates). It does not seem that this much pressure on manufacturing had been 
intended; perhaps the control system had masked the true extent of protection to 
manufacturing.  Some have said that the competitive atmosphere created after 1962 for a 
few years proved very salutary, though it is difficult to find any statistical evidence  
such as structural change or productivity growth  to reflect this.  Indeed, the latter 1960s 
saw several measures taken by the Marcos Administration to reduce the pressure.  First 
the Development Bank of the Philippines introduced an important program to aid 
distressed industries in 1966.  Second, the  Investment Incentives Act of 1967 provided 
important fiscal incentives, as well as an important step towards industrial planning.  
Third, the foreign-exchange crisis saw the re-introduction of Central Bank controls on 
imports of certain non-essential consumer goods (which were to remain in place 
throughout the 1970s). Fourth, the government introduced controls on entry to 30 
overcrowded industries in 1970 (many of them, such as textiles, the victims of 
decontrol), likewise controls that were to stay throughout the 1970s. Thus part of the 
post-decontrol experience helped feed forces for protection in the 1970s. 
 38 
FOOTNOTE 
 
                                                 
1 This section is largely based on Power and Sicat (1971) and Baldwin (1975). 
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PART III 
 
THE SECOND EPISODE: DEVALUATION AND 
THE GROWTH OF NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS, 1970-80 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This episode is characterizable in two distinct periods. In 1970 to about 1974 
there is a devaluation-induced stabilization episode with many of the characteristics of 
the post-decontrol period. The devaluation in itself represents a liberalization of the trade 
regime, but in addition, a series of export promotion measures is undertaken, most of 
them in 1970 and 1973. In the second period,  beginning in 1974, we do not perceive a 
net trend to trade liberalization in terms of conventional commercial policy measures of 
exchange-rate policy; indeed, the reverse may be true. Yet this is also the period, rather  
than 1970-74, where a fundamental restructuring of exports takes place, the result of 
rapid growth in non-traditional manufactured exports (i.e., broadly speaking, 
manufactured exports outside of traditional processed products  refined sugar, plywood, 
coconut oil, canned pineapple) and the stagnation of traditional (agriculture-based and 
mining) exports. 
We shall suggest that, while policy affecting the real exchange rate (i.e., decontrol 
in the 1960s and the 1970 devaluation) laid the basis of manufactured export growth, the 
normal export promotion measures of the early 1970s had a more marginal effect, while 
the sustained growth of these exports (till 1981 in fact) has to be understood in the 
context of falling real wage costs for manufacturing from 1969 to 1974. 
In all, this is perhaps a curious liberalization episode, in the context of our 
attempts to better understand how episodes are planned and implemented. This episode  
is largely unplanned;  the outcome of growing manufactured exports may have been 
intended, but, in our view, the apparent instruments of the specific export promotion 
policy at best contributed only a modest amount to the actual outcome. 
The abnormal characteristics of the liberalization episode make it advisable to 
depart somewhat from the reporting format for the other episodes. First, since 
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commercial policy measures are not the dominant element in this episode, we have 
grouped together, in section 2, discussion of major relevant policy development before 
we discuss the political and economic circumstances at the beginning of the episode 
(section 3). Second, there is little to say about implementation beyond what can be said 
about the policies themselves.  Third, we give separate treatment to post-liberalization 
economic performance for the sub-periods 1970-74 (section 4) and 1978-80 (section 5). 
The first period, 1970-74, is treated at somewhat greater length in terms of both policy 
and performance, since this appears to be the period when trade liberalization was 
explicitly intended. 
 
2. The Major Policies Impinging on Trade Liberalization: 
Their Nature, Targets and Implementation 
 
2.1 Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers 
 
Between 1962 and 1969 imports were largely governed by tariffs alone, albeit 
high ones. In response to the growing balance-of-payments crisis of 1967-70, foreign-
exchange controls began to be reintroduced from March, 1968.1 In June, 1969, the import 
of various categories classified as semi-essential and non-essential  by and large the 
very goods that domestic manufacturers tended to produce  were subjected (for the first 
time since 1962) to Central Bank approval.  After the devaluation of February, 1970 (see 
section 2.3), these controls (with some sother controls on invisible imports) were largely 
retained. This contrasts with the complete dismantling of such controls in 1962 in the 
decontrol episode.  After 1970 and until 1981 this Central Bank import control remained 
in place, though individual products were reclassified between controlled and 
uncontrolled categories. We believe that these reclassifications had little systematic 
liberalizing or deliberalizing effect.  More important, we believe, was the ad hoc response 
of the Central Bank to deterioration in the balance of payments:  there was a discernable 
fall in the share of consumer goods (where these Central Bank controls are concentrated) 
in the period 1974-80, when these substantial current-account deficits developed, 
compared to 1972 and 1973, the only current-account-surplus years in the 1970s.  (But 
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the fall in consumer-good share could also reflect other factors, for instance a growing 
level of investment). 
 Ever since the introduction in congress of a draft omnibus tariff reform bill in 
1964 tariff reform had been stalled by the conflict of individual pressure groups 
represented in Congress. Under the circumstances, reform of individual rates was 
undertaken within the Presidential prerogative (under various Executive Orders). One of 
the first economic acts of the government after Martial Law was declared (September, 
1972) was a thorough revision of the tariff code under Presidential Decree (PD) 34, on  
January, 1973. It was largely a rationalization of the tariff  structure, reducing many 
columns to only 6 rates ranging from 10% to 100% ad val., and intended to reduce the 
scope for technical smuggling. It could be, and was, presented as a modest step towards 
tariff reform, inasmuch as the highest rates (above 100%) were removed, a minimum 
10% tariff was introduced (thus, for instance, removing some of the  bias towards capital-
intensity by taxing imported capital goods), and all previous duty exemptions enjoyed by 
public institutions were removed.2 On the other hand, and less publicized, there was 
conscious realignment of tariff rates with the Central Bank commodity classification used 
to control imports, in an attempt to make protective instruments more consistent.3  While 
the reforms promised added consistency in protection, it is less clear whether average 
protection levels increased or not: the results of tariff-based effective protection studies 
for 1965 and 1974 (with different product coverage, different approaches to the problem 
of tariff redundancy, but otherwise broadly similar Methodologies) suggest that high 
effective protection levels for consumer goods were not much touched, but that 
considerably lower effective protection for intermediate and capital goods was further 
reduced. 
 Soon after the 1973 reform the new-found consistency in protection started to be 
undermined. On the one hand, between 1974 and 1970 many of the ad hoc tariff 
exemptions (i.e., those broadly outside of general fiscal incentive legislation) were 
reintroduced:  the ratio of estimated duty exemptions to actual duties paid on all imports 
rose from 9% in 1973 and 1974 to a level of at least 22% from 1976 to the end of the 
decade.4  The growth in ad hoc exemptions benefitted both the government and private 
firms and institutions.  On the other hand, there is evidence of the growth of ad hoc 
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legislated non-tariff barriers outside the Central Bank commodity-classifications-and-
control system, dating from the mid 1970s, though how important this is has yet to be 
ascertained. The growth of both tariff exemptions and NTBs various benefited the 
government, individual producing firms, producing sectors, and consuming firms and 
institutions. Exemptions from industrial inputs might improve a given firms level of 
effective protection vis-à-vis competing producers, while exemptions given to users for 
imports of goods competing with local production might reduce the level of effective 
protection to local production. Whatever the net effect of exemptions on effective rates of 
protection, some of them must have introduced additional distortions in domestic 
competition, while the growing use of ad hoc exemptions must surely have increased 
uncertainty. 
 
2.2  Specific Measure to Promote Non-Traditional Exports 
 
The Investment Incentives Act of 1967 (Republic Act -  RA 5286) was a piece of 
landmark legislation  in terms of the promotion of effective instruments of industrial 
planning (see section 2.6 below) through fiscal incentives.  The Act in addition legislated 
fiscal incentives for exports of non-traditional goods for the very first time.  Apart from 
enabling exporters to acquire imported inputs at world prices (through a tax credit on 
import taxes), these incentives provided for some modest subsidy to the use of local raw 
materials (via tax credits) and to export-related marketing and shipping expenses 
(through tax deductions). 
In 1970 these provisions were augmented by the Export Incentives Act (RA 6135) 
which legislated incentives for non-traditional exports of goods and services (extending 
some of the incentives to export traders) for the firms exporting in excess of 50% of their 
output.  A direct subsidy to value added was given under a formula for tax deductions 
based on the amount of use of direct labor and local raw materials. 
In November, 1972 (after some initial Congressional legislation of 1969 that was 
never implemented), provisions to create the first-export-processing zone at Mariveles, 
Bataan, and to subsidize its construction were decreed (PD 66). 
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In January, 1973, PD 92 (amending Ras 5186 and 6135) added to some previous 
incentives. The main feature for exports was to remove the tax deductions for export-
related marketing and shipping expenses under RA 5186, but to provide a stronger tax-
deduction incentive to local direct labor and raw material use than that of the RA 6135.  
In 1973, in addition, the establishment of bonded warehouses was permitted under certain 
conditions (for larger firms exporting at least 70% of their output). 
After 1973 there was no further major change in export incentives until the 
wholesale overhaul of fiscal incentives under parliamentary law BP 391 of 1983. While 
the new export incentives systems of the 1970s did provide effective means for firms to 
price their imported inputs at or near world prices, the incentive to the  use of local raw 
materials or to the firms value added was more modest. In any case the level of 
incentives as a proportion of sales to value added depended on firms ability to make 
profits (so that tax deductions could be made). A very rough guide to the evolution of 
incentives to domestic value added can be given by calculating their value with respect to 
a standard cost structure:  stylized rates of nominal and effective protection (NP and EP) 
are as follows:5 
 
 NP EP 
RA 5186, 1967 
RA 6135, 1970 
PD 92, 1973 
BP 391, 1983 
2 
4 ½ 
6 
8 
5 
10 
14 
19 
 
 
These rates and those in the likely range of estimated values appear to provide modest 
protection if we compare them to the average rate of effective protection to 
manufacturing in 1974 (44%) or the estimated overvaluation of the Peso in that year 
(34%). 
 While the trend to an increasing value of export incentives over time is clear, as 
well as an attempt to move their bias towards local labor and raw material use, it appears 
that the amendments were largely an  ad hoc form of fine tuning coming from the 
technical and economic analyses of the Board of Investments (BOI), the planning body 
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created with the Investment Incentives Act of 1967 and empowered to implement both 
this and the Export Incentives Act. 
 
2.3  Exchange Rate Policy  
 
The exchange rate crisis of 1967-70 was originally brought on by the 
expansionary macro-economic policy adopted by the incoming Marcos Administration in 
1966, and fuelled by the very large increase in money supply that preceded the 
November, 1969, presidential election. Foreign exchange controls were progressively 
applied and external borrowing led to a debt problem.  In February 1970, the Peso was 
floated; it immediately went from P3.9 to P5.5 against the Dollar and had reached P6.4 
by December 1970, when it was agreed to be fixed at that rate. The downward float, 
accompanied by conservative macroeconomic policy, was in fact a stabilization episode.  
It had happened at the instigation of the IMF, the price of getting a third tranche and 
obtaining the agreement of foreign banks to the rescheduling of external debt. 
 While the import controls were relaxed following the introduction of the package, 
controls were retained on certain consumer good imports and some invisibles. These 
retentions appear to have been a deliberate reaction to the excessive decontrol of 1962.  
The February,  1970, measures also imposed the condition that  80% of foreign exchange 
receipts from leading exports be converted at the old rate. Ostensibly intended to 
encourage further processing of export goods and to minimize the problems of excess 
domestic liquidity from increased exports, the real intention of this positive retention 
appears to have been to spur Congress to legislate proper export taxes, which it did in 
May (see section 2.4). 
 The Central Bank began to intervene actively to stabilize the exchange rate after 
1972.6  De facto exchange rate policy in the 1970s has been that of a crawling peg 
based on the US dollar. There was a moderate piece-meal devaluation from the end of 
1974 to the third quarter of 1975, and a steeper gradual devaluation from the end of 1979.  
Until the early 1980s the effective devaluation was greater than the devaluation against 
the Dollar, given the effective devaluation of the latter. Yet the falling value of the Peso 
was insufficient to prevent a growing trade deficit after 1974 (see 5.2 below on real 
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effective exchange rates). Instead, the deficit was covered at first by drawing down 
foreign exchange reserves, then by increased foreign borrowing. This policy may have 
had some initial justification because of low international interest rates in the 1970s, but 
the external debt problem was to build up to a crisis by the early 1980s. 
 
2.4 Export Taxes 
 
In May, 1979, Congress legislated export  (or stabilization) taxes under RA 6125 at 
8% or 10% on leading export products. These taxes were intended to last only until the 
end of 1973, but soon after Martial Law they were made permanent as part of the new 
tariff code.  Subsequently some new products were added. In February, 1974, an 
additional premium duty, taxing 20% of the excess international price above the level at 
this date, was introduced for 15 products.  Both the basic export tax and the premium 
duty have been varied over time for different products following international price 
trends and domestic conditions in the industry. 
Export taxes have been applied generally to stabilize prices, generate government 
revenue, encourage further processing, and safeguard domestic supply. They have not 
been justified as means of influencing  the countrys terms of trade: for the Philippines 
leading exports its only dominant share in world trade is in coconut products, but 
substitutability of these with other vegetable oil products is high. While it is true that the 
export tax has been used countercyclically since 1974, it is nonetheless the case that the 
export tax became a permanent feature of commercial policy in a decade when terms-of-
trade movements became extremely adverse. In general terms, therefore, export tax and 
export promotion policies have combined to create a distinct bias against traditional 
exports (mostly agricultural and mining) in favor of non-traditional exports (mostly 
manufactured). 
 
2.5 Policies to Agriculture7 
 
Since the 1930s the government has intervened in the sugar market to administer the US 
sugar quota.  Until the end of US Sugar Agreement in 1973, the US was virtually the only 
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export market for Philippine sugar and exporters enjoyed prices well above world levels.  
Even so, failures to fulfill quotas were the norm. The ending of the Agreement thus 
removed a powerful price support to the Industry. 
 Apart from sugar the only case of government price intervention in agriculture 
before the 1970s, apart from tariffs and taxes, occurred with its monopoly on 
international trade in rice and corn since the 1950s (i.e., the government imported as 
necessary to stabilize supply and prices).  In 1972 this monopoly was broadened to cover 
all grains (most importantly, the government controlled wheat imports). In 1981 the 
monopoly was extended to all food crops (and the government, in addition to controlling 
prices, also went into food marketing, in direct competition with the private sector). 
 From 1973 to 1982 copra farmers were levied (at the equivalent of a 20% export 
tax) for the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF). The proceeds were in 
theory meant to go back into the industry, but replanting programs under the Fund have 
apparently been modest, while much of the money had clearly not directly benefited 
farmers. Some of it was used to buy up three-quarters of oil-milling capacity under one 
institution (UNICOM). As a result, it appears that prices to farmers relative to world 
prices farmers have been driven down. 
 Since 1975, there has been an increasingly stringent ban on log exports, for 
conservation reasons (though one wonders how effective such a ban can be if it is not 
applied to downstream products as well). 
 In export agriculture, it seems therefore that policy measures including the export 
tax, have generally created disincentives for exports. For cereal production the trend is 
less obvious. There was considerable emphasis on public expenditure on rural 
development, particularly in aid of food production, in the first Marcos Administration 
(1966-70), and again in the first flush of Martial Law from 1973. This push for food  self-
sufficiency at times constituted an important subsidy to agriculture even offsetting in 
some cases  most notably irrigated rice  the disincentive of high-cost inputs. 
 Nevertheless, according to David (1983), agriculture has generally faced falling 
rates of nominal protection  over time, and its level of effective protection in the later 
1970s was in many case negative, and well below that for manufacturing. It is reasonable 
to infer a falling rate of effective protection over time, although this is not so clear in the 
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case of rice: the advent of high-yielding varieties (HYVs) in 1968 clearly increased 
productivity, while the spread of subsidized irrigation has helped offset other 
disincentives. 
 
2.6 Other Policies 
 
Macro-Economic Policy.  In 1970-72 a tight fiscal and monetary policy was pursued, 
though the signs of expansion-growth in the money supply and of the budget deficit  
were clear for 1972. Inflation became endemic in 1973 and 1974: while this was largely 
imported, these were also the years in which a more expansionary domestic policy was 
pursued. 
Restriction on Capital Movements. The Philippines has tended to follow a reasonably 
liberal policy on capital movements (except at times of balance-of-payments crisis).  
However, it has continued to restrict direct foreign investment to minority participation, 
except in the case of activities defined as pioneer under incentives legislation and in the 
case of certain wholly export-oriented operations (in Export Processing Zones, for 
instance). 
Domestic Controls. The incentives legislation of 1967 and 1970 and the creation of 
the BOI in 1967 laid the basis for stronger government controls in industrial (and agro-
industrial) investment. In addition, in 1970 the government nominated some 30 industries 
as overcrowded, including those industries such as textiles that had suffered more 
obviously under decontrol. Until the partial abandonment of this system in the early 
1980s the government had (through the control on imports of capital goods) a powerful 
weapon to control new entry (and to protect existing inefficient productive assets). In 
addition, price control legislation was introduced in 1970 and the government continued 
to exercise influence over wage levels through setting wage minima. 
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3.   Economic and Political Circumstances 
 
3.1  Economic Circumstances during the Stabilization/Devaluation 
 
The balance of payments crisis of 1967-1970 was caused by rapidly growing 
imports, stagnant exports and mounting foreign debt  (but part of this reflected the 
redirection of exports, of logs and copra particularly, to unofficial channels).  Potentially 
the breakthrough in HVY rice in 1968 provided favorable conditions for devaluation, but 
in the event inclement weather (typhoon and floods) and disease affecting the new 
varieties created considerable problems for food agriculture in 1970-72. 
 
3.2 The Political Background up to 1972 
 
The first Marcos Administration was strongly committed to economic 
achievement, especially in the area of rural development. The political motivation for this 
may have been to secure a rural electoral base, but, in addition, one of the economic 
motives was a sense in the government that the incapacity of food agriculture to respond 
more quickly to decontrol forces helped fuel inflation in the early 1960s. 
Commercial policy reform was not central to government policies. It is true there 
was something of a debate on the relative merits of a less-protected, more marketed-
oriented economy and those of a more protected and more planned economy. This was 
part of continuing debate between economic literals and economic nationalists. Indeed, 
the decontrol experience had engendered a strong feeling of the waste of economic 
resources (seen principally in the growth of excess capacity) and the need for planning, a 
feeling to an extent shared on both sides of the debate. The legislation of investment 
incentives and the creation of the BOI in 1967, as well as the provisions to control entry 
to overcrowded industries from 1970, were outcomes of this. 
By contrast, the constituency for any immediate thoroughgoing reform of import 
protection appears to have been a small one (its nucleus having been formed by some 
among a number of US-trained technocrats that Marcos began to appoint to key 
economic positions), much less powerful than the business interests favoring continued 
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protection which had been consolidating themselves in Congress. The protectionist 
position was given vital support by the common perception of the costliness of decontrol 
in the industrial sector: Tariff reform of the protection-reducing variety was hardly on the 
agenda. 
 On the other hand, the promotion of non-traditional manufactured exports was an 
objective that everyone  economic nationalists and economic liberals alike  could agree 
on:  it could be seen as a liberalizing move without however disturbing the objectives  
and vested interests  of import-substitution protection. Indeed, the legislated incentives 
of 1967 and 1970 can be seen as the expression of this one area of compromise.  For 
many, the export success of Korea and Taiwan, countries that were in the process of 
overtaking the Philippines, provided a powerful example to follow. 
Congress continued to provide a major vehicle for the representation of a diversity 
of special interests, with the results that the legislative process was drawn out.  We have 
already cited the example of tariff reform, but the BOI-drafted Exported Incentives Act 
also took a couple of years to get through Congress. It may be hypothesized that the 
passage of time from the late 1950s to the late 1960s had seen the relative eclipse in 
Congress of the sugar lobby by that of import-substituting industrialists. The legislation 
of the two incentive acts, including the creation of BOI, represented the important step of 
partially removing planning from the political process. One of the main congressional 
influences on incentives legislation appears to have been to make the conditions under 
which foreigners could invest more restrictive than the Administration wanted. 
The major external role in the area of trade-related policy during this period 
appears to have been played by the IMF whose argument for floating (or devaluing in all 
but name) the Peso in early 1970 appears to have been the decisive factor in a broader 
debate on the relative merits of devaluation vs. multiple exchange-rate vs. austerity 
measures.  However, it is also important to note that this period saw the beginning of a 
closer relationship between the Philippine and international aid donors  led by the World 
Bank  who were impressed by the Administrations development policies (the 
consultative Group for the Philippines was formed in 1970). 
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3.3 The Political Background from 1972 
 
Martial Law was declared in September 1972.  It found its political justification in 
the increasing civil unrest of 1970-72, some of which was sparked off by the 1969 
presidential election, the costliest, and many say the most corrupt to date. The 
government also forwarded an economic justification for Martial Law, a doctrine of what 
one might call progressive economic authoritarianism. Indeed, there was a spate of 
reforming moves in the early days of Martial Law, including government reorganization, 
a new rural development push, and  though less important  industrial incentives and 
tariff reform.8  In labor relations one of the first acts of Martial Law (General Order No. 
5) was to ban strikes in vital industries, broadly defined to include exporting among 
others. Labor legislation in 1972-76 sought to revamp the collective bargaining system 
along corporatist lines (anti-strike legislation in vital industries, reform of collective 
bargaining, etc.). 
This mixture of reformism and authoritarianism seems to have begun to give way 
around the mid-1970s to growing problems of coherence in economic policies and 
decision-making. We have already mentioned the growth of  ad hoc trade protection and 
given some examples of the growth of monopolies, both public (in food, for instance) and 
private (in coconut milling, for instance).  It is in the second half of the 1970s that crony 
capitalism  the development of certain favored businesses through the extension of 
fiscal advantages, credit or other monopoly  privileges -  becomes increasingly remarked 
on.  In addition, it seems that public economic decisions became less subject to broad 
government review and cabinet discussion, more subject to the ability of different 
government factions -  even individual ministries  to further their particular projects.9  
Much public investment seems to have been undertaken outside of normal budget 
provisions. 
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4. Economic Performance, 19790-74:  External Stabilization of the Economy 
 
4.1 The External Sector 
 
In the four years following the 1970 devaluation (i.e. through 1973), there was a 
substantial growth in the volume of exports. Some of this growth represented the 
gestation of large investments made in the later 1960s  particularly in copper mining, 
banana plantations and sugar milling  and could not be ascribed to the 1970 devaluation 
(though it could be ascribed to the devalution of the early 1960s). 
Exports grew by 14% in volume for 1969-70 (Table III.1).  Some of this was more 
apparent than real as some pre-devaluation export reverted to official channels.  
Nonetheless, since export volume grew by 6-7% in the following two years while the 
terms of trade declined from 1969 to 1972, there is obvious evidence of a real devaluation 
effect. But in 1973 exports were only able to expand by 8% in volume inspite of a 57% 
rise in their prices in the first year of the 1973-74 world commodity boom.  The countrys 
export price index further expanded by 48% in 1974, yet export volume fell by 11% , 
largely as a result of an enormous decline in copra exports.  As Table III.2 shows, there 
was little systematic change in the structure of exports from 1970 to 1974.  The big four 
product groups  sugar, coconut, wood, and copper concentrates  more or less 
maintained their share (around three-quarters of the total) while that of non-traditional 
manufactures grew from 12% to 16%. 
The drop in import quantity in 1970 to 6% below the 1969 level probably reflects 
anticipatory stock building as the Peso became progressively overvalued in the period 
before the devaluation.  But in fact import volumes were generally stagnant until 1974,  
when there was a very large growth in volume and Dollar prices (Dollar inflation having 
seriously set in the year before).  The period saw no significant change in the producer-
good-dominated structure of imports. 
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TABLE III.1
QUANTUM, PRICE VALUE INDICES (IN US MILLIONS), NET TERMS
OF TRADE AND PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS, 1950 - 1984
(1972 = 100)
Country Index Price Index 1/ Value Index Net Purchasing
Calendar Term Power of
Year Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports of Trade Exports
1950 43.6 20.7 61.0 106.1 86.6 30.5 173.9 49.9
1951 54.6 32.5 60.0 113.2 37.6 35.8 164.5 52.5
1952 49.6 35.7 67.0 88.2 33.6 31.8 131.6 47.0
1953 54.7 33.5 64.7 100.9 35.4 36.5 160.3 56.4
1954 60.4 37.3 61.9 96.6 37.4 36.0 156.1 58.2
1955 60.5 40.5 61.9 80.6 42.4 35.9 143.1 58
1956 63.2 45.3 62.7 89.9 39.6 40.7 143.4 65
1957 74.7 42.5 64.8 91.1 44.4 30.7 140.6 59.8
1958 66.2 46.9 66.2 94.8 43.8 44.5 143.2 67.2
1959 59.8 46.5 67.6 102.7 40.4 47.8 151.9 70.6
1960 66.0 50.6 60.1 101.2 45.6 50.6 146.4 73.2
1961 67.8 48.3 70.1 93.1 47.5 45.0 132.8 64.1
1962 64.1 53.0 71.4 94.1 45.8 49.9 131.0 69.8
1963 63.1 65.0 75.2 99.1 40.1 63.2 130.0 85.5
1964 70.0 67.4 76.8 98.3 58.9 66.3 128.0 86.3
1965 80.3 60.2 70.1 100.0 62.7 69.2 120.0 80.6
1966 85.4 73.5 75.4 100.9 67.8 74.2 127.1 93.4
1967 101.7 70.9 81.2 102.7 82.6 72.6 126.5 89.7
1968 101.2 75.4 80.6 100.1 88.7 82.3 123.1 92.8
1969 99.1 76.9 90.2 109.5 89.4 24.2 121.4 93.4
1970 92.6 80.0 93.5 111.1 86.6 97.8 110.0 104.5
1971 99.1 96.4 95.5 105.6 94.6 101.8 110.6 106.6
1972 100.0 108.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
1973 93.6 107.7 128.0 145.9 120.5 157.2 113.3 122
1974 110.3 96.2 211.6 242.3 233.5 233.2 114.5 110.1
1975 115.8 101.9 219.6 192.8 254.2 196.4 87.8 89.5
1976 122.6 130.5 217.2 168.8 266.2 220.3 77.7 101.4
1977 119.2 157.4 241.1 171.3 207.5 269.7 71.0 111.8
1978 140.9 152.6 245.0 193.7 346.3 293.1 70.0 120.2
1979 153.4 165.4 270.1 236.2 442.3 390.8 87.4 144.6
1980 155.8 201.3 350.6 216.0 558.5 495.4 60.6 133.1
1981 143.2 203.5 398.6 240.6 570.0 409.7 60.4 122.9
1982 163.4 215.0 340.5 199.9 556.3 429.7 50.7 126.2
1983 156.9 204.2 342.4 209.8 537.1 420.4 61.3 125.2
1984 1st 97.3 175.1 431.3 240.2 419.8 434.4 57.5 100.7
quarter
1/ Unit values of imports are based on  C.I.F. value while those for sexports are based on F.O.B. value.
   1950 - 1975 - Period from quarterly trade indices, (1965 = 100).
   1960 - 1971 - Period from quarterly trade indices, (1972 = 100) for the same period as given by NSCO.
Source National Census and Statistics Office.
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The backdrop to devalution of a rapidly deteriorating terms of trade (an 18% fall 
in 1969-72) saw a partial but temporary, reversal with the commodity boom of 1973-74. 
The growth of exports and restraint on imports (plus a relatively favorable 
position on invisibles) achieved a clear four year (1970 through 1973) improvement in 
the current account of the balance-of-payments. Indeed, the 1973 surplus, equivalent to 
5% of GDP (Table III.3), was unprecedented. In 1974, the position reverted to severe 
deficit as a result of the poor growth of exports. The improved trade performance allowed 
a reconstitution of foreign exchange reserves after their severe depletion in the last 
balance- of-payments crisis. There was also a notable improvement in the overhang of 
foreign debt from the crisis (and external debt as a proportion of GDP was reduced from 
29% in 1970 to 19% in 1974  Table III.4), as well as an improvement in its structure 
(i.e., a reduction of the share of the short-term component). 
TABLE III.2
THE STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS, 1970-84
(percent)
1970 1974 1980 1982
Coconut Products 18.6 22.3 14.0 11.8
Sugar 17.2 28.1 11.4 8.9
Forestry 26.4 12.4 8.1 6.1
Copper Concentrates 16.2 14.4 9.4 6.2
Sub-total 78.4 77.2 42.9 33.0
Fishery 0.2 2.4 2.2
Bananas 0.5 1.7 2.0 2.9
Other Mining 2.3 4.6 8.4 4.1
Manufactures 12.4 16.1 39.0 47
Other 6.2 5.3 10.8
Sub-total 21.6 22.8 57.1 67.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total $ m. 1,142       2,725       5,787       5,021       
Source:  Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippines.
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TABLE III.3
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE
RESERVES AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP
(Current Prices)
Balance of Payments
Goods and Non-factor
Services Balance
on Current Basic
Exports Imports Account Balance Reserves
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970 18.1 (20.4) (0.7) (0.2) 3.4
1971 18.0 (19.7) (0.03) (0.3) 4.8
1972 17.3 (19.5) (0.08) 0.8 6.5
1973 23.7 (21.0) 5.0 6.2 9.7
1974 24.2 (27.3) (1.2) 0.7 10.2
1975 20.3 (28.0) (5.6) (3.3) 8.6
1976 19.1 (26.4) (5.8) (0.8) 9.1
1977 20.1 (24.9) (3.5) 0.7 7.2
1978 19.9 (26.0) (4.8) (0.3) 7.7
1979 20.6 (27.1) (5.2) (2.1) 8.0
1980 22.6 (29.2) (5.3) (1.5) 8.8
1981 22.3 (28.8) (5.3) (2.3) 7.0
1982 19.9 (28.9) (7.7) (4.6) 6.3
1983 23.3 (32.3) (7.8) (6.4) 2.6
Source:  Calculations based on Central Bank data.
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4.2  Prices, Real Effective Exchange Rates and Real Wages 
 
The domestic price level, after low rates of inflation (even in the late 1960s), 
moves up to grow at an average of 16% p.a. in 1969-73 (Consumer Price Index, Table 
III.5) then jumped by 35% in 1974.  To an extent this inflation was pushed by the effects 
of national disasters and disease on food production in 1970-72.  However, the inflation 
rate was considerably lower than the Peso price  rise of imports and exports. 
 To capture a net measure of domestic and foreign price movements and of 
exchange rate movements we have calculated real effective exchange rates that, in 
essence, compare an index of domestic prices (in Pesos) with an index of world prices (in 
Pesos). We have taken the Consumer Price Index, which is heavily weighted to the 
Table III.4
EXTERNAL DEBT AND DEBT-SERVICE RATIO
AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP
(Current Prices)
External Debt
Total Short-term Medium Long Debt-&
+ Revolving Term Term Service 
Credits Ratio
1970 29.3 4.9 8.3 16.0 N.A.
1971 26.8 4.3 6.4 16.0 4.2
1972 26.4 3.8 5.6 16.9 4.1
1973 21.7 2.6 3.7 15.3 4.3
1974 18.5 2.2 2.4 13.8 2.8
1975 21.5 2.7 2.5 16.2 2.5
1976 28.3 3.9 2.5 21.8 2.7
1977 31.2 2.8 2.2 24.1 2.8
1978 33.8 5.5 1.6 26.5 5.2
1979 32.5 6.0 1.4 25.0 4.9
1980 34.4 7.1 2.0 25.1 2.8
1981 38.6 9.4 2.2 26.8 4.0
1982 42.4 9.9 2.1 30.3 5.1
1983 55.4 11.6 43.8 N.A N.A.
.
SOURCE: Calculations based on Central Bank data.
 56 
domestic-product-intensive consumption of low income households (and which moves 
very closely with the GDP deflator) as a proxy for the Peso price of non-tradables. Given 
the extreme divergence of world prices for different product groups, we think it unwise to 
rely on any single REER after the early 1970s, but instead we compare REERs for 
different representative product groups.  (There is also a problem, arising from the choice 
between different price indices;  in this case, it becomes, as a result, extremely difficult to 
interpret exactly how early and how severely after the period of effective devaluation, 
1970-74, domestic and world prices got out of line). Thus the REERS as we have  
defined them crudely reflect changes (assuming no change in nominal protection on 
inputs and outputs or shifts in the supply curve) in the incentive to produce non-tradables 
or (specific) tradables. Thus a falling REER for a specific tradable represents an 
increasing incentive to produce it (relative to producing non-tradables). Table III.6 
provides REERS:  for imports and exports (columns 1 and 2, using the unit price index 
from trade statistics);  for rice (col. 3); for manufactures (col. 4, using a unit price index 
for manufactured exports) col. 5 a general REER using as a world price the producer 
price index of major industrialized countries (weighted by the Philippines imports from 
them). 
 For each product group (except rice which is further discussed below) there is a 
sharp fall in the REER, following devaluation in 1970, of around 24-28%.  The improved 
REER is generally maintained for these groups until 1973 or 1974 (with the exception of 
exports in 1972), sometimes much longer.  In other words, the 1970 devaluation is, in the 
1970-74 period, dissipated neither by domestic inflation nor by the adverse movement of 
the terms of trade.  After 1973/1975 the trend to falling REERS (if at times ambiguous) is 
over. 
 Whether deflated by the wholesale or consumer price index the real wage shows a 
clear decline in the year of devaluation (Table III.7) and the declining trend is only halted 
in 1975. The fact that wage inflation was less than domestic inflation overall has 
implications both for income distribution and the pattern of comparative advantage the 
Philippines enjoys. The latter aspect is explored in connection with the growth of 
manufactured exports after 1974. 
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TABLE III.5
           
PRICE AND WAGE INDICES
(1972 = 100)
General
Index of Wholesale
Consumer Index of Average Price
GDP Price Index Manufacturing Monthly Index for
Implicit in the Wages Earnings Metro
Deflator Philippines (ASE) of Wage Manila
Earners
1949 40.1 41.2
1950 41.3 40.0
1951 44.7 44.5
1952 41.9 43.3 41.0
1953 40.4 44.3 40.6
1954 39.8 46.6 38.5
1955 39.4 47.9 37.5
1956 40.5 43.3 48.6 38.7
1957 41.2 44.3 50.3 40.4
1958 42.2 46.7 50.7 41.7
1959 41.3 49.6 52.9 42.3
1960 43.3 50.4 56.0 44.1
1961 45.4 n.a. 56.2 46.2
1962 46.7 52.7 57.0 48.6
1963 50.5 55.4 57.6 53.3
1964 54.9 58.5 60.2 55.8
1966 59.5 68.6 70.4 59.5
1967 62.7 n.a. 74.4 61.0
1968 64.1 72.6 74.8 62.7
1969 65.0 76.2 77.9 63.5
1970 83.2 74.6 85.4 83.8 78.5
1971 93.6 85.8 98.1 90.6 90.8
1972 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1973 117.8 116.2 102.7 101.9 123.7
1974 155.3 156.3 119.4 111.9 182.7
1975 167.6 167.0 144.2 125.3 192.6
1976 183.6 183.2 148.7 143.8 210.3
1977 199.6 200.4 171.0 144.8 225.9
1978 215.7 215.5 183.2 164.4 236.8
1979 249.6 253.2 212.0 204.6 281.8
1980 286.9 299.4 262.0 247.0 333.4
1981 317.3 338.6 377.0
1982 343.5 373.3 423.9
1983 380.4 410.6 492.8
Source:  NEDA National Accounts Staff:  Central Bank, Statistical Bulletin;
NSCO, Annual Survey of Establishments.
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Table III.6
  
REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES FOR SELECTEDSECTORS
(RATIO OF CONSUMER PRICE INDEX TO WORLD PRICE INDEX)
Import Export Rice IS Manufacturing "General"
REER REER REER REER REER
1949
1950 223.2 130.3
1951 214.9 132.2
1952 204.4 157.5
1953 206.1 124.3
1954 212.8 137.7
1955 210.7 148.7
1956 213.2 150.6
1957 210.2 151.5
1958 211.0 149.1
1959 201.5 134.5
1960 207.2 143.4 153.5 189.1 199.0
1961 214.2 163.3 161.0 197.4 206.0
1962 113.1 96.7 82.9 106.6 112.0
1963 113.5 92.0 83.3 114.0 116.0
1964 122.0 95.8 88.5 120.9 125.0
1965 123.8 97.3 89.4 124.1 127.0
1966 127.1 101.2 79.8 122.4 131.0
1967 130.6 104.7 80.1 126.9 135.0
1968 122.1 100.6 79.8 139.0 136.0
1969 121.7 101.6 83.9 140.4 133.0
1970 91.4 78.3 81.5 98.8 95.0
1971 92.9 86.1 110.7 95.0 97.0
1972 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1973 88.2 78.8 47.1 92.2 90.0
1974 72.0 63.5 32.9 99.5 117.0
1975 69.5 80.0 53.9 87.4 108.0
1976 74.6 98.2 75.6 91.4 109.0
1977 73.8 106.4 85.2 92.8 111.0
1978 78.3 101.7 65.1 84.9 109.0
1979 83.7 97.8 82.1 89.8 117.0
1980 73.5 109.1 73.0 96.4 117.0
1981 71.4 120.0 109.9 119.0
1982 85.3 147.4 114.9 121.0
1983 72.1 117.5
Source: Calculations based on Central Bank, Balisacan and Unnevehr (1982),
World Bank, Commodity Price Trends, ADB.
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TABLE III.7
INDICES OF REAL WAGES
(1972 = 100)
Wage Deflated by Wholesale
Wage Deflated by CPI Price Index
Manufacturing Wage Earners Manufacturing Wage Earners
1949
1950
1951
1952 103.3 105.6
1953 109.7 109.1
1954 117.1 121.0
1955 121.6 127.7
1956 106.9 120.0 111.9 125.6
1957 107.5 122.1 109.6 124.5
1958 110.7 120.1 112.0 121.6
1959 120.1 128.1 117.3 125.1
1960 116.3 129.3 114.2 127.0
1961 n.a. 123.8 n.a. 121.6
1962 112.8 122.1 108.4 117.3
1963 109.7 114.1 103.9 108.1
1964 106.6 109.7 104.8 107.9
1965 110.6 112.3 110.0 111.8
1966 115.3 118.3 115.3 118.3
1967 n.a. 118.7 n.a. 122.0
1968 113.3 116.7 115.8 119.3
1969 117.2 119.8 120.0 122.7
1970 114.4 112.3 108.0 106.8
1971 114.3 105.6 108.0 99.8
1972 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1973 88.3 87.7 83.0 82.4
1974 76.4 71.6 65.4 61.2
1975 86.3 75.0 74.9 65.1
1976 81.2 78.5 70.7 68.4
1977 85.3 72.3 75.7 64.1
1978 85.0 76.3 77.4 69.4
1979 83.7 80.8 75.2 72.6
1980 87.5 82.5 78.6 74.1
Source: Table III.5
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4.3  Production 
 
The successful external stabilization of the economy had no obvious counterpart 
in the growth of the economy. Overall GDP growth rates in 1969-72 picked up a little 
from those of the late 1960s. In agriculture growth in 1970 and 1971 was indeed higher 
than in 1968 and 1969, but it was still generally low inspite of strong export growth and 
because of natural disasters and crop disease. Manufacturing saw neither expansion nor 
contraction in its growth. 1973 was a high-growth year across all sectors. It was led by 
the commodity boom and the demand thus generated by the export sectors for industrial 
goods and for services.  There was in the 1970-74 period little discernible change in the 
structure of the economy. 
 
4.4  Labor and Unemployment 
 
At first view, the labor and unemployment statistics show little change in levels of 
activity in 1970-74 that can obviously be associated with the devaluation episode.  
(According to the statistics there is a marked drop in open unemployment, from 6.7% in 
1969 to 3.2% in 1974, but these statistics are open to doubt). 
 
4.5  Capital 
 
The most notable feature of the period 1970-73 is the fall in the level of 
investment:  in the last three years of the previous decade investment averaged 21% of 
GNP, but in 1970-73 it averaged 16-17%. This may be associated particularly with 
changes in the level of government investment consequent on the conservative macro-
economic policies pursued in this period. 
 
4.6  Income Distribution 
 
The direct evidence on income distribution trends is not always clear, though there 
are signs of an increasing inequality of income in the 1970s. The declining real wage 
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mentioned above (which may however not have a very firm statistical foundation) has 
clear implications of a falling incomes share to wage labor, to the benefit of capital/land 
and/or government consumption. 
 
4.7  1970-74: A Summing-up 
 
The 1970-74 devaluation episode saw a stabilization of the external sector  balance-
of-payments, reserves and foreign debt. While export performance was aided by 1960s 
investment coming on stream, it was not helped by the terms of trade. Macroeconomic 
restraint helped make devaluation effective until 1973. Its gradual loss of effectiveness 
from this period can be ascribed to more expansionary macroeconomic policy, but above 
all the terms of trade shock after 1974 which was insufficiently offset by exchange rate 
adjustment. The failure of the economy to grow faster reflects not only the cost of 
external stabilization, but also the external disasters in food in 1970-72. 
 
 The direct effect of devaluation was clearly greatest on the existing export sectors 
(including the new sectors, such as bananas, resulting from investment in the 1960s).  
There seems to have been notably little direct impact on manufacturing: instead of the 
improved REER for manufacturing stimulating import substitution, it is reasonable to 
suppose that the increased peso Price of world manufactures merely increased the level of 
tariff redundancy for a sector that had already exploited most import-substitution 
possibilities (including backward linkages). Nonetheless, manufacture exports became 
more attractive relative to import substitution and, even if they had less obvious impact in 
1970-74 than later, they nonetheless grew in this period. 
 
5 Economic Performance, 1974-80:  The Leading Role of Non-Traditional Exports 
 
5.1 The External Sector 
 
In quantity terms export grew impressively from 1974, and faster than in the 
preceding years (at 8% p.a. in 1975-82). It is not clear how much of this was due to the 
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growth of non-traditional manufactures, but coconut oil, pineapple, bananas and lumber 
also showed sustained growth in the second half of the 1970s. However, prices were very 
unstable and continued to fall in real terms. Between 1974 and 1980 there was a 
fundamental change in the structure of exports: the share of the top four export groups 
(coconut, sugar, wood, and copper concentrates) fell from 77% to 43%, while the share of 
manufactured exports rose from 16% to 39% (Table III.2). 
Volume growth of imports was substantial (5% p.a. in 1975 82), but less than for 
exports.  However, import price rises were far higher. Part of this import growth was 
directly related to export growth in the form of imported inputs. 
After a 34% decline in the terms of trade in 1975, these continued to decline with 
scarcely a rally (at 6% p.a. on average in 1975-82) (Table III.1). 
Invisible exports and imports grew relative to merchandise trade in 1970s.  Part of 
the growth of invisible exports was from the remittances of contract workers (which, 
from negligible levels in 1970, had come to account for one-quarter of such exports by 
1982).  But invisibles accounted for one-third of the large current deficit of the balance of 
payments by 1982.  The item principally accounting for this deficit was the steady rise in 
interest payments on foreign loans (see below). 
 In the period 1973-75 the current account of the balance of payments went from 
unprecedentedly large surplus (+5% of GDP in 1973) to unprecedentedly large deficit (-
6% of GDP in 1975). This level of deficit (in terms of GDP) was maintained for the rest 
of the 1970s (Table III.3). At the onset (in 1975), the current deficit was partly financed 
by drawing down international reserves, but from then on (until 1983) reserves were 
maintained at a higher level and the current-account deficit was financed by increased 
external borrowing (Table III.4). In 1974, external debt was equivalent to 19% of GDP, 
while by 1983 the figure had risen to 55% (in the same time short-term and revolving 
debt alone rose from 2% to 11% of GDP). From 1977 there was a marked growth in the 
ratio of debt-service payments to GDP. 
 In all, the post 1974 policy of accommodating a semi-permanent current account 
deficit with foreign borrowing that accumulated external debt represents a remarkable 
turn-around from the policies of external balance pursued in 1970-74. For several years, 
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it may have been possible to justify this fundamental change in external policy by the 
low, even negative, level of real international interest rates. 
 Inspite of the generally depressed nature of international markets after the 
turbulence of 1973-74, the growth record of the Philippine economy after 1974 appeared 
to be better than in the period preceding it, as the  following average real annual growth 
rates indicate: 
 
    GDP  Agriculture  Manufacturing 
 1969-74  5.7         3.9   8.0 
 1974-80  6.6         4.4   6.4 
 
The improvement in agricultural growth may partly have reflected the impact of the 
government food program from 1973. In particular, it was only after the natural disasters 
of the early 1970s that rice could realize the full potential of the green revolution. The 
apparent fall in manufacturing output may in part reflect the effects of foreign exchange 
shortages after 1974:  the two best years of growth, 1976 and 1977, were the years when 
the current account deficit was smallest. Manufacturing growth would also have been 
smaller, of course, without the growth of non-traditional exports (with an estimated 
reduction of around one-half a percentage point of manufacturing GDP p.a.). 
 From 1975 rates of GDP growth in construction were high. This reflected a clear 
quickening in the pace of investment which rose from 22% of GDP in 1973 to 31% in 
1975 and stayed at this for higher level for the rest of the 1970s. (As several sources have 
pointed out, this also led to higher ICORS, and the implication of this, as well as of  the 
casual evidence about investment projects, is that there was considerable inefficiency and 
wasted investment for the mid 1970s). This increase in investment seems to have been 
largely directed at infrastructure, both in the private sector (for instance an epidemic of 
hotel building) and in the public sector. Indeed public investment and public guarantees 
of private investment (through the Development Bank of the Philippines for instance) 
were an important factor in the accumulation of external debt. 
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 The increase in investment may also have been a deliberate counter-cyclical 
measure. In general macroeconomic policy in the second half of the 1970s was more 
expansionary than in the first half. 
 
5.2 Real Effective Exchange Rates 
 
While there was an undeniable deterioration in the balance of payments after 
1974, the evidence on the re-alignment of REERS  which one might expect to 
accompany such a deterioration  is difficult to interpret.  One conventional   form of 
REER compares the movement of domestic and foreign price levels (in a common 
currency, the foreign price levels being weighted by domestic imports or exports).  Such 
measures for the Philippines clearly indicate that, after a period of historically low 
REERS in 1970-73, there was a clear deterioration in 1974 that was maintained thereafter 
(see row 6 of the text table below).  Several commentators have used this kind of measure 
to indicate an apparent fall in Philippine competitiveness and link it to overvaluation of 
the exchange rate (see col. 2 of Table I.18 above, for such an index).10 
Yet the REERS we used earlier in this chapter  comparing the Philippine CPI to 
world price indicators for specific tradeable commodity groups (Table III.6) do not tell 
quite the same story:  earlier there is no obvious deterioration in REERS after 1974 or the 
deterioration is not as severe as for the REER discussed in the preceding paragraph.  This 
can be seen in the following figures (rows 1 to 5) comparing the average REER for 1974-
80 with that for 1970-73 (1970-73  = 100): 
 
A. CPI-numerator REERS: 
1. CPI/Unit price of imports         81 
2. CPI/Unit price of exports      109 
3. CPI/World price of rice        79 
4. CPI/World price of manufactures       95 
5. CPI/Import-weighted world producer price    115 
B. Producer-Price-numerator REER: 
6. WPI/Import-weighted world producer price    125 
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The CPI-based figures show a deteriorating REER for exports (reflecting poor export 
prices),  but an improved REER for manufactures, imports and rice. 
  Why the difference among the different forms of REER? First, there was an 
important divergence in 1972-74 between the CPI (and the GDP deflator which acts in a 
very similar manner) and the Wholesale Price Index (WPI). Over this two year period the 
WPI rose by 83%, the CPI by 56%.  The divergence has since been maintained more or 
less.  The reason for  this is not entirely clear, but since the CPI is a reasonable proxy for 
non-tradable prices, while the WPI is entirely composed of domestic and imported 
tradable goods, one can argue that the process of rapid world inflation in 1972-74 
permanently affected the ratio of non-tradable to tradable prices. (In this sense rapid 
external inflation unmatched by internal inflation is exactly the same as a domestic 
devaluation).  (This argument at the very least needs further refinement: both the 1960-62 
decontrol and the 1970 devaluation increased the WPI faster than the CPI, but the relative 
cheapening of non-tradables did not last for more than two years in either episode). 
  The second source of divergence in REERs relates of course to the world price 
series.  In this respect, it appears that the (weighted) producer prices of the Philippines 
major trading partners (i.e. the OECD countries) behaved differently from their export 
prices, inflation being greater in the mid-1970s in their export prices than their producer 
prices. 
  In summary, even though the period 1975-80 is characterized by large trade 
deficits, there is no unambiguous evidence of deteriorating (i.e. rising) REERS to explain 
this. Instead it is plausible to explain much, it not all, of the deficit as the result of the 
import requirements of the higher investment ratio. In order for the tradables-producing 
sector to accommodate this rising import requirement  without a current-account deficit, 
the Peso would have needed to devalue further and the REER also to have fallen. 
 
5.3  Non-traditional Exports 
 
  More needs to be said about the growth of non-traditional manufactured exports.  
The basis for such exports was laid by decontrol, the 1970 devaluation, certain aspects of 
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export incentives, and the apparent maintenance (i.e. non-deterioration) in the 1970s of 
the REER for manufactures ( in other words the CPI did not grew faster than the world 
Peso price of manufactures). In addition, there is evidence of large fall in real industrial 
wages between 1969 and 1974-75 and the maintenance of this new  lower level, more or 
less, from then until the end of the 1970s. Real wages fell in terms both of workers 
consumption (i.e. deflated by the CPI) and of their costs to employers (i.e. deflated by the 
WPI). Since the WPI rose  faster in the period 1972-1974, the fall in real wage GSIS is 
larger than in workersreal consumption. The movement in real wage costs must have 
laid a very strong basis for the expansion of non-traditional exports after 1974. 
   
 
 
 
TABLE III.8
EVOLUTION OF NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS, 1970-83
Total Non-Traditional Consignment Share of Share of
Exports Exports Imports Non-Traditional Non-Traditional
in in Total Exports
Total Exports in Manufacturing
Output
Gross Net of 
Consigments
Imports
1970 1,142.2 94.5 4.1 8.3 7.9 5.4
1971 1,189.3 107.5 4.6 9.0 8.7 5.4
1972 1,168.4 116.0 8.3 9.9 9.3 6.1
1973 1,837.2 226.8 60.1 12.3 9.4 8.7
1974 2,725.0 327.4 128.9 12.0 7.6 6.4
1975 2,294.5 374.3 183.6 16.3 9.0 7.5
1976 2,573.7 573.4 286.7 22.3 12.5 9.5
1977 3,150.9 769.3 279.0 24.4 17.1 8.7
1978 3,424.9 1,076.2 442.6 31.4 21.2 10.0
1979 4,601.2 1,519.5 612.4 33.0 22.7 12.9
1980 5,787.8 2,106.9 858.0 36.4 25.3 12.7
1981 5,722.2 2,571.6 1,006.7 44.9 33.2
1982 5,020.6 2,460.7 993.0 49.0 36.4
1983 5,005.3 2,537.2 1,007.0 50.7 38.3
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippines.
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  These exports grew from 10% to 39% of total exports in  1974-80, or 9% to 25% 
if we make a rough calculation to exclude most of the imported input of these exports 
(Table III.8).  The major features of this new export activity are: 
 
- The dominance of labor- and import-intensive garment and electronics 
assembly, most of this taking place in exclaves  (bonded warehouses largely, 
but also export-processing zones) with little linkage to, impact on, other sectors; 
- The development, nonetheless, of a broad variety of other export activities 
(particularly food products, handicrafts, furniture, and footwear) with greater 
linkages; 
- a mixture of local (often themselves non-traditional) and foreign entrepreneurs. 
 
5.4   1974-80: A summing Up 
 
 A reasonable growth of the economy was sustained in this period while the current 
account of the balance-of-payments experienced a permanent (until the crisis of the 
1980s at least) deficit. Initially this deficit can be understood as a failure to adjust the 
exchange rate sufficiently quickly to  a rapid decline in the terms of trade, but for the 
period as a whole it can also be understood as a failure to adjust the exchange rate to the 
import requirements of an increased investment rate. Instead of exchange-rate 
adjustment, the external sector used external borrowing to accommodate the deficit.  In 
view of the declining terms of trade for non-traditional exports, export performance 
overall in 1974-80 was rather successful, in terms not only of volume growth, but also of 
the shift out of primary commodities. In our view the successful growth of non-traditional 
manufactured exports has several (no doubt interrelated) explanations which we 
tentatively place in very rough order of descending importance as follows: 
 
- a series of favorable moves in the real effective exchange rate for manufacturing 
that starts with decontrol in the 1960s and continues with the 1970 devaluation. 
- a fall  in real wage costs, cementing these REER developments, from 1969 to 
1974, and stagnation in real wage costs thereafter; 
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- the legislation of various export incentives in 1970 and 1973, the most important 
of which we believe to be those allowing exporters to acquire imported inputs at 
world prices (subsidies to domestic value added being less important); 
- a surge of foreign investment in 1973 and 1974 that can probably be associated 
with the stable investment climate that early Martial Law provided in the eyes of 
foreign investors; 
- reasonably favorable international demand trends in the 1970s. 
 
 It could be said that the early 1970s marked a  watershed period after which the 
balance shifted from Philippine exports of resource-based (agricultural) products to 
exports of labor (in the form either of valued added in footloose industrial activities or 
of contract labor). In this respect, the role of declining/stagnant real wage costs is 
interesting to pursue. There may be several possible components: 
 
- the effect of the 1970 devaluation 
- the effects on the labor market of Martial Law (the strike ban for vital industries 
in 1972, etc.) ;  most of the fall in real wage had occurred prior to Martial Law, 
but it is possible that the new labor market conditions may have helped prevent a 
return to the levels associated with the 1960s 
- It is also reasonable to argue that real wage costs could be maintained at a low 
level by the relatively lower rate of inflation in consumer prices (especially for 
lower income levels) than in prices for tradable (as reflected in the WPI)  
 
After 1974 domestic rice price declined in real terms as a consequence of the HYV 
breakthrough in the late 1960s and a broad program of government support to the 
industry from 1973.  This development, which must have had a considerable influence in 
stabilizing the CPI, stands in the contrast to the effect of rising rice-price on the CPI in 
the 1960s.  In turn, it may be the case that poor terms of trade for export agriculture in the 
second half of the 1970s helped remove the pressure on and which affected food crops 
and which has been argued to be a feature of the rising price of rice in the early 1960s. 
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 Thus the surge of non-traditional exports appears to have more to do with the 
exchange rate, price and wage movements (and behind some of these political and 
agricultural developments) than with commercial policy per se. 
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Notes to Part III 
 
                                                 
1 Baldwin (1975); pp. 69-72. 
 
2 Sicat (1974), p. 56. 
 
3 Tariff Commission (1976). 
 
4 Calculated from various annual Tariff Commission Reports. 
 
5 These figures represent a rough median between an import-intensive and local-raw-materials-
incentive cost structure, as well as between an average-profit (10% margin on sales), and high-profit 
(25% margin on sales) cost structure. 
 
6 See Pante (1982). 
 
7 See David (1983). 
 
8 See Chapter 3 of Sicat (1974). 
 
9 See for instance Sicat (1984). 
 
1110 See Pante (1982) and Bautista and Power (1979), p. 29 
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PART IV 
THE TARIFF REFORM PROGRAM:  1981-1985 
 
A. The Introduction of A Liberalization Policy 
 
In terms of long term policy pattern the liberalization starting in 1981did not happen 
following a trade crisis (as in 1969 and 1970) or a clamor for giving better terms to exporting 
(as in 1960).1 Yet this appears to have been a potentially more fundamental form of 
liberalization than 1960 or 1970 and was probably the first important structural change to the 
protective nature of the Philippine tariff since 1957. 
Several interrelated factors contributed to this deliberate program to liberalize. One was 
the country’s membership in GATT in 1980 which carried a commitment to reduce tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to trade.  Indeed for a few months after the country’s official membership 
in January a number of import duties was reduced, and commodities removed from restricted 
imports.2 Another was the availability of new financing sources, mainly from the World 
Bank, to support basic structural adjustments.  Indeed the country was one of the first ones to 
have used structural adjustment loans (SAL) in pursuing trade liberalization and industrial 
restructuring. Another was the increasing acceptance within the larger economic policy 
circles of tariff reform and trade liberalization as important ingredients to efficiency and 
rational industrial development.3  Indeed there had been expressed, especially by Sicat,4  the 
weaknesses of policy in promoting open trading systems. And then, there was the 
convenience of promulgating a liberalization program in a political atmosphere of 
unorganized if not ineffective dissent coupled with a strong and monolithic regime.  Indeed 
one notices the thinness of debate and discussion of reforms with  far reaching consequences  
compared with the protracted  and heated arguments surrounding decontrol, the new tariff 
code of 1973 and the floating of the exchange rate in 1970. 
 
A.1  Nature and Targets of Policy 
 
The 1981 trade liberalization has two major components5 (1) the loosening of quantitative 
restrictions (QR), or a more general import liberalization and (2) the reduction of protection 
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by tariffs, or a more general tariff reform.  In terms of the latter the broad targets include the 
reduction in the degree of tariff escalation i.e. the cascading nature of tariffs, and the 
lowering of the average rate of nominal protection from 45 percent to 28 percent by 1985.  
For the former the broad target was to eliminate the need for licensing or approval for import 
of 1,304 items. 
 The achievement of the broad targets in the tariff reform was planned to be pursued in 4 
stages covering 14 major industries and 10 residual sectors over the course of a 5-year period 
1981-1985. 
 Although the tariff program per se had no explicit thrust with regard to export 
encouragement, it was clear that the narrowing of effective protection rates (EPR) across 
sectors implied raising the EPR for some exports from negative values to a positive level or 
to reducing the penalty to these sectors.  Where export encouragement played a role was in 
the associated changes in policy that affected the incentive system.6 
 The four  phases of the tariff reform program are shown in Table IV.I together with the 
nature of the tariff changes to be made and the number of tariff lines covered by the sectors.  
It is evident that the larger fraction of the tariff modifications is for rate reductions.  The rate 
increases would mostly cover commodities or industries where nominal rates are  below 10 
percent. 
 Quantifying the general target, this means reducing the range of nominal tariffs from 0 to 
100 percent to 10 to 50 percent.  In turn this means targeting an EPR range of 10-80 percent 
compared to a situation before 1981 of a range from negative EPR’s to over 200 percent for 
some consumer goods.  The revised tariff schedules were incorporated in the new Tariff and 
Customs Code of 1982.7 
 On the import liberalization program, the general target of policy was to phase out the 
need for seeking clearance or prior approval from the Central Bank (CB) for the importation 
of non-essential consumer (NEC) and Unclassified Consumer (UC) items. Until the 
liberalization program in 1981, some 1,304 items belonged to the NEC/UC category. The 
multi-stage phasing of the relaxation of import restrictions was aimed at completely 
liberalizing all these items in 1985. 
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 In addition some 26 groups of “regulated” commodities which importation was 
controlled by the Central Bank were to be liberalized in 1982. These commodities were 
categorized according to reasons for regulation – the safeguard of public health and safety, 
national security, local industry protection, complement to on-going content programs and 
others. 
 
A.2  Intended Sequences of Liberalization 
 
Table IV.1 lays out the phasing of the tariff reform program, explicitly indicating the 
sectors to be affected and within each the items and products subject to modification. The 
stages however were not tightly sequenced in the sense that there were some overlaps. The 
phasing over a 5-year period was to allow sufficient time for industries affected to adjust to 
new rates and thus competitive rules. 
For instance, phase I was intended to be pushed over a 2-year period, 1981 and 1982, 
such that the peak rates were not to be eliminated overnight but in 2 stages. In 1981 the 
ceiling rates were to be reduced to 70 percent ad valorem and further reduced to 50 percent in 
1982.  The process in the first phase implied a deceleration from peak rates to 70 percent and 
a slower reduction to the new ceilings of 50 percent. 
 The three other phases were to become effective over not more than one year, i.e. phases 
2 and 3 effected in January 1981 while phase 4 became operative in August, 1981.8 
For the import liberalization part of the policy the sequencing is clearly more numerically 
defined.  In particular the  number of items to be liberalized accelerated before  settling down 
to a limited number with a remaining  set that were to continue to be restricted for reasons of 
health, defense or safety. The latter numbered 145 items. Again the sequencing was in yearly 
phases – 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984. Thus 263 items to be liberalized in January 1981.  
Another 610 were to be taken off the list in January 1982, 87 in 1983 and the residual by 
1984. 
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 The 960 items that  were scheduled to be liberalized over a 3-year period, 1981-83, 
belong to the food, chemical, cosmetic, pharmaceutical, wood, leather, rubber and plastic 
product, textiles and garments, furniture and travel goods, footwear and headgear, and 
electrical and electronic appliances industries.  Fore the regulated commodities specific dates 
were given for their liberalization: viz caustic soda, basic iron and steel products, tires 
(except used tires), gasoline and kerosene engines (by January 1982); fabrics and textiles, 
vinyl-asbestos tiles and sheets and newsprint, Portland cement, sheet glass (by January 
1985).9 
 Despite therefore the numerical precision of the numbers to be liberalized  the future 
sequencing of policy was vague with the exception of 12 items that had specific dates or the 
broad industries which formed the NEC/UC items. 
 
TABLE IV.1
TARIFF REFORM PROGRAM
1981-1985
PHASES
I II III IV
food processing cement agriculture and
iron and steel    forestry products
textiles and automotive
   garments wood & wood product basic chemcial
cycles    and petroleum
Item/Sectors leather and glass and ceramics
Covered    footwear furniture basic non-ferrous
domestic appliance
pulp and paper machineries and
  capital equipment
electrical goods
Number of tariff
lines covered: 177 272 396 480
For modifications: all 184 229 149
a. For reduction 167 129 128
b. For increase 14 16 13
c.  Others 3 15 8
Source:  Tariff Commission (1982).
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A.3  Economic Circumstances 
 
In the immediate 3 years preceding the 1981 trade liberalization, exports had been 
growing at 17 percent per year and imports at 10 percent per year.  In real terms however 
exports had been growing substantially faster than imports at 9.0 percent per annum 
compared to 3.4 percent per year for imports.  The balance on current account of the balance 
of payments further deteriorated from a deficit of US $1.2 billion in 1978 to US $1.9 billion 
in 1980. 
 Table IV.2 presents the balance of payments for the period 1978-1983 for the various 
accounts.  It can be seen that in 1978 the current account balance deteriorated by more than 
50 percent and in subsequent years the deficit further widened.  Because of substantial inflow 
of  long-term loans however the basic balance did not appear to suffer as much (in 
comparison to a 1975 peak deficit). 
 The official reserves transactions balance (which ultimately determines the claim on 
financing and settlement) implied an increase in reserves in 1977 and a slight reduction in 
1978.  From 1979 onwards however there has been a continuous depletion of exchange 
reserves. 
 Thus external accounts in the 2 or 3 years before liberalization depicted an adverse 
balance of payments position occasioned by large deficits in the balance on goods and 
services. While the long-term capital account (principally through long-term and not 
investment) may have cushioned the severity of the basic balance, it may have only masked 
the required adjustments that were reflected in the current account and trade balances. 
Overall Philippine GNP was growing at real annual rates of 3.4 percent (1978-80), low in 
comparison to the immediate 5-year period at 6.2 percent per year but certainly higher than 
2.8 percent growth of real GNP in the industrialized countries.10  Both the US and Japan, the 
country’s major trading partners, had real growth rates below this average.  In fact the real 
declines were experienced  by these two countries.  Indeed the world was suffering from the 
second oil shock and the recession that followed. 
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TABLE IV.2
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1970-1983
(IN MILLION US DOLLARS)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
1 . Exports of Goods and Services 4,838 6,177 8,018 8,618 8,004 7,995
2 . Imports of Goods and Services (6,323) (8,108) (10,340) (11,151) (11,611) (11,101)
3 . Balance of Goods and Services (1,485) (1,931) (2,330) (2,533) (3,607) (3,102)
4 . Private Remittances 312 355 434 472 486 399
5 . Balance on Current Account (1,173) (1,576) (1,984) (2,061) (3,121) (2,707)
6 . Long-term Capital 1,062 1,250 930 (1,507) (1,365) 1,431
   Direct Investment 171 99 (102) 175 17 4
   Long Term Loans 891 1,151 1,032 1,332 1,540 1,427
7 . Basic Balance (111) (326) (974) (544) (1,556) (1,276)
8 . Private STC and Errors and Omission 25 (313) 436 (433) (308) (925)
    Short-term Capital 168 (48) 310 (219) (56) (925)
    Errors and Omissions (143) (264) 126 (214) (252) 0
9 . Official Reserves Transactions Balance (86) (639) (538) (897) (1,864) (2,201)
  
10 . Gold Movement, SDR, Monetization of Gold 32 69 157 427 277 183
11 Total Change in Reserves 54 570 301 (560) 1,587 2,018
Source:  Central Bank of the Philippines.
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 The overall nature of trade and exchange rate in the aggregate economy in the 3 years 
before the 1981 trade liberalization seems to have been slightly restrictive.  For instance the 
ratio of black market to official exchange rate slightly increased in 1978-80. Similarly 
“implicit import premium” increased in 1979 before easing up again in 1980.11 Our estimates 
of the EPR for 1979 are only joint estimates and therefore are unable to describe protection in 
the period preceding liberalization except to compare them with 1974.12  
 More aggregative price indicators also tend to show the apparent restrictiveness in the 2 
or 3 years prior to the 1981 trade liberalization. Table IV.3  shows several of these.  Although 
the indices of prices for all imports and import-substituting manufacturing have moved in 
similar fashion, the ratio of domestic to world price for imports increased. Alternatively the 
effective exchange rate for four goods classified according to essentiality favored large 
margins for non-essential consumer goods over exports whether traditional or new (TX and 
NX) implying some premium of domestic import substitution. 
The inflation rate in the country, measured by CPI increased by 7.6 percent in 1978, 18.8 
percent in 1979, and17.8 percent in 1980.  Measured by WPI the rates were 6.8 percent in  
1978, 19.0 percent in 1979 and 18.3 percent in 1980. 
 
A.4  Political Circumstances 
 
 There was a generally stable political environment when the 1981 trade liberalization 
policy was implemented. The growing dissent, the more activist media, and a stronger 
political opposition came only after the Aquino assassination and subsequent economic crisis 
of 1983. Thus it can be inferred that political circumstances even before liberalization were 
equally stable. 
The regime that sponsored the policy has been in power since 1966 and one may 
therefore ask why did such a fundamental reform come at a time later than desirable? In fact 
the same political regime was in power in the floating of the exchange rate in 1970. Of 
course the big difference was the centralization of power as a result of the 1972 declaration 
of Martial Law, the abolition of the legislature, and the use of presidential decrees in its 
stead. 
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TABLE IV. 3
SELECTED AGGREGATE PRICE INDICES
(1972 = 100 EXCEPT EER)
1978 1979 1980
Wholesale Price Index (Imports) 250.0 288.3 358.9
Import-Substituting Manufacturing 252.2 306.4 378.7
All Exports 271.5 335.4 343.2
Ratio of Domestic to World Price for Imports 88.3 90.9 95.3
Ratio of Domestic to World Price for Exports 128.1 129.5 125.1
Effective Exchange Rate (EER),
   pesos per US dollar:  a/
   NEC 25.32 25.35 25.80
EC 8.80 8.81 8.97
TX 7.08 7.08 7.21
NX 8.67 8.55 8.70
Guiding Rate (pesos per US Dollar) 7.37 7.38 7.51
a/
NEC - Non-essential Consumer goods
EC - Essential consumer goods
TX - Traditional Exports
NX - New Exports
Sources: Appendix Tables
Senga(1983)
Central Bank of the Philippines
 79 
 The subsequent changes in tariff rates were merely marginal such as the 1973 revisions to 
the Tariff Code (Presidential Decree No. 34) the 1978 Tariff and Customs Code (P.D. No. 
1464) and other executive order. These did not change the basic bias and distortion of the 
protective nature of Philippine tariffs (which had remained similar to 1965). Moreover the 
increasing use of decrees to grant tariff exemptions to industries or individual firms 
effectively created further distortions to the structure towards uncertain directions, especially 
after 1974.13 For example, out of about 102 decrees or instructions relating to the 
manufacturing sector since 1972, 69 were instituted after 1975. Instead of harnessing a 
favorable political climate towards a more rational incentive structure for trade and industry, 
the machinery turned out fragmented decrees that probably stifled growth. 
 The increasing realization of this and the conviction among a larger set of policy makers 
about the need for a more open trading system facilitated the 1981 trade liberalization.  
Conversely the thinness of its consistency in policy circles may partly explain the drag in the 
policy formulation. By the late seventies the intellectual ferment from both academe and 
government contributed to the jelling of a need for basic policy reforms to industrial and 
trade incentives.14 
 At the same time the accession of the country to GATT membership and the emergence 
at the World Bank of more flexible support for structural adjustments combined to create a 
political need for trade liberalization. 
 It is difficult to judge the strength of the influence of an international organization such as 
the World Bank in the 1981 trade liberalization versus the indigenous “technology” and 
political will. Negotiations for structural lending to the country began as early as 1979.15  It is 
known that an explicit plan was necessary for support with a SAL. Although in the final 
analysis the mechanics and sectoral incidence of liberalization were probably drawn up 
independently it seems clear that the political circumstances surrounding it were 
unidirectional. 
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B. Accompanying Policies 
 
The various policies that will be described here are those that may have been pursued to 
accompany the 1981 trade liberalization or those that matter (in the complementary sense) to 
the degree of impact of such a liberalization drive. 
 
B.1  Exchange Rate Policy 
 
When the liberalization program got underway in 1981 the exchange rate policy was one 
of a floating rate with margins established by “guiding rates” on dollar trading floors 
established by the Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP). Except for some marginal 
exchange regulations (e.g. increased foreign exchange allowance for travel,16 export 
prohibitions of foreign exchange without CB approval 17 etc.), there were no new forms of 
exchange controls in that year. The prevailing average rate in 1981 was P8.200 per US dollar. 
In the early 1982 exchange controls were further relaxed such as forgoing certain 
documentation requirements for imports by “no-dollar importation”,18  reduction in reserve 
requirements for import letters of credit from 100 percent to 50 percent by July 1982.  By the 
second half of the year however controls started to increase.  For instance by October  the net 
foreign exchange position of commercial banks could not exceed 20 percent of outstanding 
letters of credit and all excess exchange holdings were to be sold to the Central Bank.19 By 
December an import surcharge of 3 percent for all import transactions was imposed.20 
 In 1983 the severity of exchange controls accelerated culminating in the suspension of 
exchange transactions in November of that year. In January restrictions were placed for 
imports under documents against acceptance (D/A) and open accounts (O/A).21  Duties were 
made payable at the time of opening of letters of credit.  Required reserves were raised to 100 
percent against marginal deposits for importers’ letters of credit for imports  of liberalized 
items. The approvals for import applications for fresh fruit, electronic products and liquors 
were suspended. Finally in November the Central Bank required all banks to sell 100 percent 
of their foreign exchange receipts, a priority system for their use established and an 
additional import duty of 5 percent imposed. 
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 There were two exchange rate devaluations in 1983. The first in June, raised the rate to 
P11 to a US dollar.  By October of the same year the second devaluation took place and the 
guiding rate was P14 to a US dollar. The guiding rates for 1982 and 1983 were P9.171 and 
P14.002 per US dollar, respectively. In terms of real effective exchange rates however the 
index appreciated slightly by 1.4 percent in 1981 increasing by 3.7 percent in 1982 before 
depreciating in 1983 arising from the exchange rate adjustment of June and October. 
 The real effective exchange rate (REER) defined as 
 
  REER = Σ (m ij /mi ) r j / Pj 
               i=j 
    ----------------------- 
     ri /Pi 
     
(where m  / m is the share of imports from country  j  to i’s total imports,  r  (k = i or j)  is the 
price of  US dollar in terms of index of k’s  currency and P  (k = i or j) is the wholesale price 
index in k’s currency with (May 1970 as base year) depreciated during the first 3 months 
after the official beginning of the 1981 trade liberalization (January). In the next 3 months 
however a real appreciation took place and the index of REER in June was 141.9 compared 
to the January index of 138.1. At the end of 1981 the index showed a real depreciation of 3.7 
index points relative to January. 
 
B.2.  Export Promotion Policy 
 
The deliberate export promotion policy in the country was started in earnest in 1970 as a 
complement to the broader investment incentives package drawn up in 1967. These two 
policies were considered part of a change in trade orientation in 1970. The liberalization 
attendant to this has been discussed elsewhere. Our purpose here is simply to highlight 
changes which may have been instituted in concert with the tariff reform program or which 
may have occurred within its implementation span. 
 
 Prior to 1983, the operating incentives were incorporated in the 1967 and 1970 acts as 
well as subsequent revisions such as Presidential Decree (PD) 92, 485 and 1789.  In general 
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the incentives given to exporters (whether as producer, trader or service exporter) consisted 
of provision for tax breaks related to the purchase of equipment and raw materials (whether 
imported or locally produced), deduction from taxable income of reinvestments, direct labor 
costs (not to exceed 25 percent of export revenues) and net operating losses. 
 A new Investment Incentives Policy Act of 1983 was implemented in that year intended 
to correct the biases of the previous promotions incentives. The features of this Act include 
an emphasis on performance, streamlining of bureaucracy and limitation of previously 
generous provisions. For example a number of incentives with capital cheapening bias were 
discontinued (accelerated depreciation, allowance for reinvestments, deduction for 
preoperating expenses).  And then two new incentives were introduced. One provided for a 
tax credit on net value earned which is 5  percent for non-pioneer and 10 percent for pioneer 
projects for 5 years. The other provided for a tax credit on net local content for exporters also 
for 5 years (with a further 5 years on an incremental basis). In this new incentive scheme 
therefore the value of incentives is determined by performance rather than value of 
investment. 
 
B.3.  Monetary Policy 
 
 Monetary policy at the start of liberalization in 1981 was moderately tight to counteract 
the growing deficits in the external accounts. A financial crisis in early 1981 however 
reversed this towards moderate expansion for the rest of the year as the Central Bank bailed 
out financial institutions to restore confidence. 
 
 Monetary policy was likewise moderately expansionary in 1982 to accommodate 
expected recovery (and stimulate the economy) from the 1979 recession. Reserve 
requirements were reduced during the year. Growth in Central Bank new domestic assets was 
rapid at 63 percent between December 1981 and December 1982. A 62 percent rise in net 
credit to the public sector was mainly responsible for this reflecting expansion of the budget. 
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 By 1983 policy became less expansionary to reduce balance of payments deficit.  Growth 
in CB net credit to the public sector declined as the budget deficit was cut especially between 
end December 1982 and March and June 1983.  But towards the latter part of the year reserve 
money expanded again to provide large overdrafts and emergency lending to financial 
institutions experiencing substantial withdrawals. 
 In all the pattern of monetary policy during the 1981 liberalization can be characterized 
by some tightening in early 1981 which was frustrated in the middle of that year due to a 
domestic financial crisis. In the next year and a half some relaxation took place after which 
another tightening  happened in early 1983. Again the financial crisis of that year resulted in 
a rapid expansion of credit that needed mopping up in 1984. Figure IV.1 shows the growth 
changes in basic monetary aggregates while Table IV.4 presents some aggregate monetary 
data. 
 A financial reform in 1980 included interest rate deregulation for borrowing and lending, 
fiscal incentives to increase equity investments in financial institutions and legislation 
towards broader banking services all of which were meant to improve savings and the 
intermediation process. 
 
B.4  Fiscal Policy 
 
 This discussion of fiscal policy concerns itself with (a) the general government economic 
functions during the liberalization period which constitute one form of an accompanying 
policy and (b) some specific fiscal policies with direct implications for the trade  
liberalization episode. 
 Since the recession of 1979 the government had adopted a countercyclical policy 
(through deficit financing) with an expectation of a recovery a year or two later.  Yet this did 
not materialize.  Given that the deficits were financed ultimately from foreign borrowings the 
consequences turned out to be precarious for the economy in the early eighties culminating in 
the exchange crisis in 1983. 
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TABLE IV. 4
MONETARY POLICY INDICATORS
Dec. Dec. Dec. March
Unit 1981 1982 1983 1984
Central Bank (CB) Accounts
  Net Domestic Amounts (Bill P) 20.598 33.617 52.731 59.331
Reserve Money M " 17.798 18.644 27.723 24.843
                       M " 82.100 95.300 113.000
Required Reserves (Commercial Bank) (Percent) 19.9 18.0 23.0 24.0
Manila Reference Rate (MRR-90 days) " n.a. 16.7 16.9 16.1
Money Market Rates (Interbank) " 14.9 16.0
CB Interest Rate
    Non-traditional Exports (Percent) 3 3 7 MRR90-9
    Traditional Exports " 5 8 MRR90-6 6
Commercial Bank Rate (Percent) (1) 9.8 9.7 9.7
    Savings Deposits " (1) 17.4 22.5 15.5
    Time Deposits " 18 14.4 16.2 21.5
    Lending "
Real Interest Rate 157.1 177.6 223.9 238.2
     CPI (1978 = 100) (Percent) (1) 5.5 4.3 4.1
     Savins " (1) 9.8 10 6.5
     Time " 11.4 8.1 7.2 9
     Lending "
(1)  =  No ceiling as of July 1, 1981.
Source of Basic Data:  IMF (1984).
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 The rapid deterioration of the government accounts is reflected in the increasing ratio of 
aggregate deficits to GNP from 0.2 percent in 1979 to 4.3 percent in 1982. This sharply fell 
in 1983 to 1.6 percent of GNP. The domestic-based deficit did not deteriorate as rapidly since 
expenditures exclude repayments-less-lending. 
 The ratio of government consumption expenditures to total government expenditures 
declined from 1979 to 1982 or 1983 indicating an increase in investment expenditures.  
When the deficits had to scaled down however capital shares had to suffer thus raising again 
the share of government consumption to all government expenditures. Table IV. 5 reports 
some fiscal policy indicators. 
 In general, indirect taxes constitute about 60-70 percent of the tax revenue sources of the 
government. This share has been quite stable even before the liberalization drive. Within 
indirect taxes, international trade transactions taxes are half, mostly in the form of import 
duties. It is not much the reliance however on indirect taxes for revenue that is important in 
trade liberalization as in their use as protective instruments and thus influencing resource 
allocation. For instance, advance sales and excise taxes varied differently according to the 
degree of essentiality of imports. Moreover higher nominal rates were imposed in imports 
than equivalent domestically produced goods. Finally the tax base for the calculation of these 
taxes was generally marked-up in varying percentages depending on landed costs. In other 
words the fiscal system had accorded considerable protection to the manufacturing sector 
through the system of indirect taxes.   
 The rationalization of this indirect taxes structure that distorts the protective system is the 
more direct accompanying piece to the 1981 trade liberalization.22  The program involved the 
removal or differential taxes for imported and locally produced goods simultaneously 
simplifying tax administration. 
 Most of the fiscal realignments took place in 1983, such as the imposition of a uniform 
25 percent advance sales tax on imports (March 1983), the reduction in the number of tax 
brackets for cigarettes from 10 to 6, the reduction in tax differentials on imported and 
domestically produced spirits, wines, and cinematographic films.23 
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TABLE IV.5
GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURES
1979-1983
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
1 Total Revenue a/  (billion pesos) 29.3 34.4 35.7 30.0 45.3
2 Domestic Revenue  (billion pesos) 39.1 34.1 33.5 37.7 45.0
3 Total Expenditure  (billion pesos) 29.7 37.7 47.9 52.4 51.5
4 Domestic Expenditure b (billion pesos) 25.4 32.6 30.9 40.8 43.4
5 Surplus/Deficit, (1)-(3)  (billion pesos) (0.4) (0.7) (12.2) (14.4) (6.2)
6 Current GNP  (billion pesos) 221.0 265.1 383.6 336.1 377.4
7 Current National Income  (billion pesos) 200.4 240.5 273.0 301.4 338.2
8 (5) / (6)  (percent) (0.2) (0.3) (4.0) (4.3) (1.6)
9 (5) / (7) (percent) (0.2) (0.3) (4.5) (4.8) (1.6)
10 Government Consumption Expenditure  (billion pesos) 10.3 21.2 24.8 29.2 31.4
11 (10) / (3) (percent) 61.6 36.2 51.8 55.7 61.0
a/ Includes grants received.
b/ Includes lending minus repayments.
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics (various issues).
NEDA, Philippine Statistical Yearbook (various years).
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B.5  Restrictions of International Capital Movements 
 
The manner of regulating capital movements is partly coursed through foreign exchange 
transactions in the banking system. In this context as early as 1972, inward and outward capital 
movements with the exception of certain transactions related to the financing of international 
trade required prior and specific approval of the CB.24 The flexibility given to agent banks in 
balancing foreign exchange holdings also dictate partly the degree of restriction or relaxation to 
acquisition of invisible instruments. This has ranged from requiring banks to have full foreign 
exchange cover for their foreign currency liabilities to requiring a certain fraction of net foreign 
exchange position that banks can hold (e.g. 20 percent of outstanding letter of credit). 
As a general rule however restrictions are placed on outflows of capital than inflows 
wherein the latter is even encouraged. There have been minor changes of the policies in this field 
during the 1981 trade liberalization except in the 1983 foreign exchange crisis. 
 
B.6  Domestic Controls 
 
Price and wage controls are instituted for certain commodities and some categories 
principally to protect consumers from excessive price fluctuations and to guarantee reasonable 
earnings consistent with living costs. These domestic controls have now been in force for at least 
a decade. There is no explicit indication that domestic controls have been made an integral part 
of the liberalization policy. 
 Only basic commodities that constitute the consumption basket of low income classes are 
generally controlled including petroleum products, electricity, transport fares and rental for 
dwellings (below certain levels). A Price Stabilization Council (PSC) determines the list and 
decides on ceiling changes. The list includes food items (rice, corn, eggs, pork, chicken, sugar, 
canned fish, milk) and school supplies. Successive adjustments to these prices have been 
undertaken especially after the 1983 exchange crisis and the subsequent inflation. 
 Since minimum wage legislation began in the fifties (which set floor wages for 
agriculture and non-agriculture workers) more than twenty changes have been instituted through 
legislative acts, decrees or wage orders. After Martial Law in 1972, wage setting included the 
provision of additional  allowances  and 13th month pay.  Inspite of the fact however that control 
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of wages were meant to allow them to keep pace with cost-of-living changes, wage setting does 
not have an explicit specification that relates how it should adjust. Consequently real wages have 
been falling for workers since the 1981 trade liberalization. Table IV.6 below shows the trend of 
legislated real wages for the National Capital Region (NCR), and outside for non-agricultural 
labor, and agricultural wages (both plantation and non-plantation). 
 
 
 
C. Implementation of the Liberalization Policy 
 
From Table IV.1 above the various phases of the tariff reform program part of the 1981 
trade liberalization were implemented according to schedule. There were of course several 
serious departures from the announced scheme which can be traced as due more from exogenous 
circumstances than from the implementation of it (or its earlier phases). 
TABLE IV.6
LEGISLATED DAILY REAL WAGES
1981 - 1984
(PESOS)
1981 1982 1983 a/ 1984 b/
Non-agriculture:  NCR 20.28 18.07 17.63 16.72
Non-agriculture: Non-NCR 20.01 17.81 17.79 16.80
Agriculture:  Plantation 16.04 15.17 14.86 14.03
Agriculture:  Non-Plantation 12.79 11.38 11.11 10.58
a/
   Average for June-December
b/
   Average for January-November
Source:  National Wages Council, Ministry of Labor and Employment.
 90 
 In late 1982 and early 1983 import surcharges were imposed across-the-board for all 
import transactions largely due to the deterioration in the balance of payments. This did not 
affect however the continued pursuit of the reform program in the sense that the surcharges were 
considered temporary and had a neutral marginal effect on the relative tariffs targeted to be 
affected. 
 On the part of import liberalization the scheduled relaxation of 87 items in 1983 was 
reduced to 48 in response to hearings conducted by the Ministry of Trade and Industry.25 
 The major setback to the trade liberalization was the exchange crisis in October 1983.  
Firstly this resulted in the redundancy of the tariff system as all exchange transactions were 
effectively controlled.  Yet the tariff changes were still implemented according to schedule.  
Secondly new quantitative restrictions were imposed and in fact consolidated by October 1984 
under CB Circular 1029.26  Finally priorities were established for the use of foreign exchange 
upon partial resumption of trading transactions. 
 Political stability was shaken in the latter part of the third year of implementation but it 
had nothing to do with the liberalization drive.  It probably delayed it in terms of effects.  In fact 
objections to the liberalization program have been fragmented and the government maintained 
that series objections to the reforms should be considered in an integrated manner and in view of 
the entire changes in resource allocation.27 
 During the implementation of the tariff reform the distribution and values of nominal 
tariffs gradually changed and by the end of 1983 the average nominal tariff fell to 29 percent 
from 43 percent in 1980.  Similarly in accordance with Phase I peak rates were cut from 100 
percent.  At the end of  1982 there were no tariff lines with rates of 100 percent. 
 Table IV. 7 shows the tariff rates and the number of lines with those rates, the total 
number of tariff lines, and the average nominal tariff rates by year.  It can be seen that in 1981 
peak rates were reduced to a ceiling of 70 percent. 
 
D. Economic Performance Following Liberalization 
 
By reason of the fact that the 1981 trade liberalization is yet to be fully completed by 
1985, that it has been held in abeyance during the period of the 1983-1985 crisis, that the 
conditions under which it was to be implemented have changed and that any after effects 
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(whether positive or negative) have differential time paths, economic performance at this stage 
would simply provide a monitoring function although constituting a critical component of its 
eventual impact. 
 
D.1. Major Prices 
 
The consumer price index (CPI) for the year 1980 had been growing at a rate of about 3 
percent over the previous quarter. At the start of 1981 CPI increased by a percent less than the 
previous quarter’s increase, fluctuating and reaching by 1982 (4th quarter) an increase of 10 
TABLE IV.7
TARIFF REFORM PROGRAM
1980-1985
Number of Tariff Lines
Tariff  Rates (percent) 1980 a/ 1981 1982 1983
10 322 671 660 650
20 197 420 429 452
30 211 284 341 344
50 186 252 525 366
70 128 182 83 134
100 327 2 - -
Total Number* 1283 2300 2300 2300
Average Nominal (percent) 43 34 30 29
a/ Based on PD 1464
* Does not sum to column items because of other tariff rates.
Source:  Tariff Commission (1983).
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percent over the third quarter. On the other hand incrases in the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) 
had fallen off beginning the first quarter of 1981 and continued to increase slowly until the last 2 
quarters of 1983. 
Real exchange rates varied throughout 1980-1983 and had shown some real depreciation 
towards the end of 1980. However in 1981 the exchange rate (towards the end of that  year)  
appreciated slightly. For 1982 there was initially a real appreciation before leveling off at rates 
marginally lower than 1981.  Sharp real depreciation came in 1983. 
The nominal effective rate showed an appreciation throughout the 1981-1983 II  period 
and the fall in the real effective exchange rate was therefore due more to increases in WPI 
(relative to the country’s trading partners) than of adjustments to the nominal exchange rates. 
Table IV.4 shows the movements of various interest rates.  What is  most noticeable from 
the table is the sticky real interest rate movement inspite of  the deregulation of it beginning with 
the 1980 financial reforms. 
The real (daily) wages of non-agricultural workers in Metro Manila show an index that 
sharply declined until 1982 before recovering the 1980 levels in 1983.  The structural decline in 
real wages especially in the seventies  is quite marked and is not captured in this limited 
indicator after 1980. 
Table IV.8 reports the movements in major prices over the period 1980-1983.  The 
quarterly changes in the unit value of exports and  imports indicate very drastic fall in the former   
compared to the latter or higher increases in the latter compared to the former all implying a 
deterioration in the terms of trade.  After the June 1983 devaluation however the movements 
started to favor better unit values for exports. 
 
D.2. The External Transactions 
 
Table IV.9 shows the pattern of quarterly external transactions for 1981-1983 including 
percent change in them, some balance of payments measures and external debt.  It is difficult to 
discern any pattern to the movement of aggregate imports even on a quarterly basis since the 
liberalization was staggered across different sectors, the emergence of restrictions towards end-
1982 and 1983 and of adverse exchange rate movements (in 1983).  A separate estimate for 
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imports under NEC and UC reveal that these accounted for 1.2 percent of total imports in 1981 
compared to 0.9 percent in 1980 reflecting a 33 percent increase. 
The pattern for exports is also not discernible.  There has been a decline in exports in the 
last 3 quarters of 1981. What is important to notice is the decline in the share of the 19 prinicpal 
exports and the continuing increase in manufactured exports. Trade balances have remained 
negative worsening after the first quarter of 1981. 
 
 
 
TABLE IV.8
MAJOR PRICES:  1980 - 1983
1980 1981 1982 1983
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
CPI (percent change) 3.2 3.6 3.1 2.1 1.7 5.1 4.1 3.4 0.7 3.4 10.0 1.7 1.5 5.3 12.3
WPI (percent change) (1.3) 2.2 4.6 3.4 3.2 2.3 2.1 2.8 2.7 3.1 1.4 0.4 1.8 6.2 19.0
Nominal Exchange Rate (P/$) 7.42 7.49 7.55 7.58 7.68 7.96 8.1 8.29 8.29 8.41 8.66 8.9 9.45 10.1 11.0 13.9
NER (end of quarter, May 1978=100) 69.44 65.44 65.1 64.85 66.46 69.6 70.51 68.81 72.4 73.78 75.53 72.07 73.44 73.63
RER (end of quarter, May 1970=100) 143.6 131.6 132 136 134.22 141.87 138.17 134.38 142 144.9 149 133.4 129.57 118.21
Real Wages (1980=100) 100 94.35 84.94
Unit Value of Exports (percent change) (3.3) 2.3 5.7 4.6 (5.4) (5.2) (1.3) (5.2) 1.7 (2.8) 3.0 6.5 14.7 6.0 53.8
Unit Value of Imports (percent change) 2.9 2.7 8.6 (3.1) 13.4 8-8.2 0.0 (7.4) 3.1 (7.9) 9.3 26.7 (3.7) (4.0) 52.9
Source of Basic Data:  IMF, International Financial Statistics (various issues).
TABLE IV.9
EXTERNAL TRANSACTIONS ACCOUNTS: 1981 I - 1983 III
1   9   8   1 1   9   8   2
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
(Million US Dollars) (Percent Change) (Million US Dollars) (Percent Change)
Imports (fob) 1,897 2,034 2,902 1,922 -1.40 7.22 2.85 -8.11 2,101 2,159 2,044 1,952 9.31 2.76 -5.33 -4.50
SITC  0 - 4 767 902 885 803 -8.03 17.60 -1.88 -9.26 793 910 735 800 -1.24 14.75 -19.23 8.84
SITC  5 - 9 1,130 1,131 1,207 1,119 3.67 0.00 6.72 7.29 1,307 1,249 1,310 1,154 16.00 -4.44 4.80 -11.91
Exports (fob) 1,593 1,451 1,346 1,333 4.46 -8.91 -7.24 -0.96 1,289 1,345 1,184 1,214 -4.00 6.00 -11.97 2.53
SITC  0 - 4 969 788 645 646 8.63 -18.68 -18.15 -0.15 623 701 532 627 -3.56 12.52 -24.11 17.86
SITC  5 - 9 622 659 698 685 -1.43 5.95 5.92 -1.88 646 644 652 587 -5.69 -0.31 1.24 -9.97
10 Principal 934 712 648 656 78.24 -23.77 -9.00 1.23 635 687 584 620 -3.20 8.19 -14.99 6.16
Trade Balance -305 -503 -746 -589 -23.56 91.15 27.96 -21.04 -832 -814 -860 -730 41.26 -2.16 5.65 -14.19
Current Account Balance -291 -616 -885 -649 -35.76 111.68 43.67 -26.67 -829 -851 -931 -746 27.73 2.65 9.40 -19.87
Foreign Debt 26.45 27.59 3088.00 3303.00 7.38 4.31 11.92 6.96 34.88 37.10 39.61 - 5.60 6.36 6.79 -
Export + Imports/GDP - 0.44 - - - - - - - 0.41 - 0.38 - - - -
Exchange Rate (Pesos/US $) 7.68 7.86 7.96 8.10 - 2.30 1.30 1.70 8.29 8.41 8.55 8.90 2.3 1.4 1.7 4.1
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Notice that the ratio of exports and imports to GDP has been declining from 1980 to 1981  
– from 46 percent to 38.4 percent in the first semester of 1983. 
There is very little from these external transactions accounts that indicate sharp 
departures from previous trade. For example, the declining share of 10 principal exports has been 
a noticeable pattern since the early seventies and not really unique to the period after trade 
liberalization. Similarly the import structure remains the same in terms of seasonality of value, 
distribution by primary (SITC 0-4) and manufactured (SITC 5-9) goods category, and absolute 
levels. The trade balance as well as current account balance has however shown a significant 
TABLE IV.9 (continued)……
1   9   8   3 a
I II III I II III
(Million US Dollars) (Percent Change)
Imports (cif) 1,962 2,002 2,000 0.51 2.04 -0.10
SITC  0 - 4 821 784 719 2.62 -4.51 -8.29
SITC  5 - 9 1,131 1,219 1,282 -1.99 7.78 5.17
Exports (fob) 1,166 1,247 1,222 -3.95 6.95 -2.00
SITC  0 - 4 595 590 533 -5.10 -0.84 -6.27
SITC  5 - 9 570 636 669 -2.90 11.58 5.19
10 Principal 607 617 - -2.10 1.65 -
Trade Balance -786 -755 -778 6.50 -3.94 3.05
Current Account Balance -778 -684 -739 4.29 -12.00 8.04
Foreign Debt
Export + Imports/GDP - 0.42 - - - -
Exchange Rate (Pesos/US $) 9.45 10.09 11.00 6.2 6.8 9.0
a/  all imports at c.i.f. prices.
Sources:  1981:  CB, Philippine Financial Statistics, March 1982.
               1982 & 1983:  ADB, Key Indicators of Developing Member Countries of ADB, APRIL 1984.
                Except 10 Principal Exports and Foreign Public Debt, from CB, PPS.
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deterioration on a quarterly basis especially between the first and the third quarters of 1981. The 
degree of openness of the economy likewise did not see any noticeable change in value as 
measured by the ratio of export and import value to gross domestic product. While it fell in 1982, 
this recovered in 1983. 
There is also only small changes in the nominal exchange rates, deteriorating by around 
16 percent between the beginning of 1981 and the last quarter of 1982. Given the movements of 
the consumer price indices during the same period, the real exchange rates appreciated lending 
support to the notion why the trade balance did not vary in terms of exports and imports flows. 
 
D.3 Income and Product 
 
At the aggregative level, it was shown (see Part I) that GNP’s growth rate in 1980-1983 
was at 2.6 percent per  year, brought down in part by the 1983 economic crisis. This means that 
on a per capita basis real GNP declined Agriculture, fishing and forestry suffered most while 
services the least. Industry’s growth decelerated in contrast to the historical rates it was 
previously experiencing.  Table IV.10 shows the industrial origin of GDP for 1980-1983. 
It can be seen from the table that manufacturing progressively deteriorated in growth 
between 1980 and 1983 – from a growth rate of 3.4 percent in 1981 to 2.1 percent and 2.4 
percent growth in 1982 and 1983, respectively. Within manufacturing several industries showed 
real deceleration. These include leather and leather products, chemical and chemical products, 
transport equipment and products of petroleum and coal. Others such as textile manufactures and 
paper and paper products suffered as well but it appears these have been their condition even 
before 1980. Table IV.11 presents the gross value added for manufacturing by industry from 
1972 to 1983 in order to highlight the longer term movements rather than just the structure 
between 1980 and 1983. 
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TABLE IV.10
INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
(Billion 1972 Pesos)
1980 1981 1982 r 1983 p
Agriculture, fishery and forestry 23.7 24.6 25.4 24.8
Industry 33.5 35.0 35.7 36.0
Mining and Quarrying 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.0
Manufacturing 23.2 24.0 24.5 25.1
Construction 7.1 7.8 8.1 7.7
Electricity, gas, and water 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
Services 35.4 36.6 37.9 39.3
Transport, communication and storage 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.3
Trade 12.2 12.7 13.1 13.9
Finance and Housing 7.1 7.0 7.3 7.8
Other Services 11.3 11.9 12.4 12.3
GDP 92.6 96.2 99.0 100.1
r/  - revised
p/ - preliminary
Source:  NEDA National Account Staff
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TABLE IV.11
GROSS VALUE ADDED IN MANUFACTURING BY INDUSTRY GROUP
AT CONSTANT 1972 PRICES
(IN MILLION OF PESOS)
Industry Group 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Food manufactures 3623 3871 4129 4245 4558 7189 7498 7865 8419 8803 9099 9246
Beverage industries 724 758 787 808 859 661 585 707 732 730 747 765
Tobacco manufactures 950 1291 1457 1542 1556 979 990 1858 1039 1100 1114 1117
Textile manufactures 798 852 899 923 1097 940 1022 1071 1049 1095 1053 1050
Footwear wearing apparel 431 533 544 591 628 785 857 932 1019 1109 1224 1247
Wood and cork products 582 627 638 471 558 629 660 686 665 707 704 716
Furniture and fixtures 86 90 88 74 79 104 107 114 132 139 140 142
Paper and paper products 345 420 480 486 558 186 193 282 191 188 172 196
Publishing and printing 265 339 430 447 455 252 283 301 324 344 359 360
Leather and leather products 22 25 26 30 31 43 45 49 68 70 71 66
Rubber products 220 238 257 263 232 274 293 312 302 311 324 316
Chemical & chemical products 1012 1994 2075 2165 2462 2038 2165 2321 2365 2317 2273 2315
Products of petroleum & coal 1048 1358 1219 1230 1134 1294 1325 1398 1373 1287 1313 1351
Non-metallic mineral products 445 597 541 597 613 478 520 535 574 540 569 587
Basic metal industries 409 526 505 587 631 756 819 865 853 791 856 947
Metal industries 401 414 424 398 309 807 952 1040 1041 977 1052 1091
Machinery except electrical 184 206 193 190 195 540 618 678 226 764 787 797
Electrical machinery 355 376 400 443 394 591 814 1005 1153 1401 1475 1717
Transport equipment 516 561 688 842 854 760 875 898 885 918 883 742
Miscellaneous manufactures 172 176 193 205 218 168 198 230 265 296 320 334
GROSS VALUE ADDED IN
      MANUFACTURING 12588 15252 15973 16537 17421 19492 20917 22239 23175 23959 24535 25108
Source:  NEDA.
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To see what has been the pattern of the imports to total supply for the manufacturing 
sector Table IV.12 presents the shares of imports to total supply for selected manufacturing 
industries from 1980 to 1983. Chemical and chemical products industries show an increase in 
import share to supply along with paper and paper products, textile manufactures, and metal 
products. Transport equipment industries however show a marked decline in imports over the 
period. 
 
D.4. Employment and Unemployment 
 
Employment series in the Philippines come (since 1980) from two surveys conducted at 
the end of the third and fourth quarters of the year. Prior to 1979 employment breakdown by 
major sectors of the national income accounts were available. After that breakdowns have been 
categorized only as either agricultural or non-agricultural employment. Table IV.13 presents a 
brief account of aggregate labor force, employment, unemployment rate and labor force 
participation rate. 
The cyclical nature of the labor force participation rate is apparent from the figures 
between the third and fourth quarters of each year. The same is true for the unemployment rate – 
higher during the third quarter of each year. 
The employment figures outlined above have probably less meaning in the context of 
understanding the employment implications of liberalization. What is more relevant is 
information concerning factory shutdowns, workers terminated, reasons for shutdowns and other 
related conditions. The Ministry of labor and Employment records establishments reporting 
shutdown and employment status. It is difficult to put a lot of weight to the information in this 
regard since they are simply based on those establishments which report and the coverage 
therefore varies. But their movements over time may reveal the industrial incidence of lay-offs or 
shutdowns. For instance the share of workers in manufacturing to the total number of workers 
terminated had not really increased substantially in 1983 and 1984 contrary to expectations 
surrounding the economic crisis during these periods. Whereas in 1981 81.1 percent of all 
workers terminated as reported by firms came from the manufacturing sector, the ratio fell to 
69.5 percent in 1982, 73.7 percent in 1983 and 62.4 percent in 1984. There has also been  
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increases in the coverage of establishments although no breakdown by industry of these firms 
reporting is available. Table IV.14 summarizes the distribution of terminated workers according 
to industry. 
 
TABLE IV.12
SHARES  OF TOTAL DOMESTIC SUPPLY *
MANUFACTURING: 1980 - 1983
(IN PERCENT)
Industry Group 1980 1981 1982 1983
Food manufactures 15.6 15.8 16.8 16.0
Beverage and tobacco 6.5 6.9 8.5 10.3
Petroleum & coal products 63.9 64.2 60.9 62.6
Chemical & chemical products 48.4 50.1 50.8 54.8
Rubber products 30.8 25.7 30.0 25.6
Paper and paper products 35.2 32.4 38.3 37.6
Textile manufactures 19.0 19.3 19.4 26.6
Non-metallic mineral products 24.8 15.6 14.5 12.6
Basic metal 57.1 53.6 57.9 54.6
Metal Products 47.6 48.2 50.6 50.5
Machinery except electrical 84.0 81.3 81.2 82.0
Electrical machinery 57.6 55.2 52.3 52.3
Transport equipment 72.3 61.0 57.7 65.6
Miscellaneous manufactures 63.7 59.7 55.6 57.3
*Imports are derived in peso cif values from the NCSO Foreign Trade
Statistics (1980 to 1983) and the values are divided by the sum of imports
and domestic value added.
Source of Basic Data:  NCSO, Foreign Trade Statistics
                                  NEDA, Philippine Statistical Yearbook (1984).
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The major part of terminated workers belong to the manufacturing sector which is also 
the more sensitive sector to be affected by any liberalization drive.  The rest of the sectors are 
either service-oriented or are non-tradable. Thus the movements reflected in Table IV.14 suggest 
that the proportionate share of manufacturing workers terminated had been declining since 1981.  
This point however needs to be adjusted for the possible bias in the incremental coverage of 
reporting establishments for the subsequent years. Unless the industry distribution of reporting 
firms for the four years has remained the same it is difficult to associate the decline as an 
economic consequence of trade liberalization. 
 
 
TABLE IV.13
EMPLOYMENT
1980 1981 1982 1983
III IV III IV III IV III IV
Working Age (000) a 28,835       29,072       29,701       30,023       30,747       30,978       31,676       31,907       
Labor Force (000) 17,705       18,638       18,421       19,005       18,488       19,900       20,465       20,521       
Participation Rate (percent) 61.4 64.2 61.7 62.6 60.1 63.6 64.6 64.3
Unemployment Rate (percent) 5.4 4.3 5.3 5.4 6.0 5.5 4.6 4.1
Underemployment Rate (percent) 30.1 31.8
a/ Population 15 years and older
b/ Available beginning first quarter 1983.
Source:  NCSO
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TABLE IV.14
DISTRIBUTION OF TERMINATED WORKERS BY INDUSTRY
1981-1984
1981 1982 1983 1984
Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry 3,399         1,347         7,218         3,888         
Mining and Quarrying 3,420         6,175         1,685         6,574         
Manufacturing 63,648       34,436       55,613       58,283       
Electricity, Gas and Water 0 0 0 0
Construction 1,055         1,373         2,814         6,621         
Wholesale and Retail Trade 2,351         1,629         3,545         6,412         
Transport, Storage and Communication 1,743         2,638         1,745         4,140         
Others 2,850         1,914         2,792         7,318         
Total Workers Terminated 78,466       49,512       75,428       93,386       
Number of Reporting Establishments n.a. 638            1,267         2,212         
Source: Labor Statistics Division, Ministry of Labor and Employment.
n.a. - not available.
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FOOTNOTES 
 
 
1It is partly for this reason that there is no sharp dip in the curve of the liberalization index. 
 
2In Memorandum to Authorized Agent Banks (MAAB) No. 2 (January 28) 66 tariff headings were removed from 
the restricted import category and made fully importable.  In February (MAAB No. 587) 13 tariff were reduced.  In 
May another 29 lines from restricted categories were lifted (MAAB No. 10). 
 
 A country’s accession to GATT does not of course obligate a unilateral tariff reduction.  But in the case of 
the Philippines it appears that the country went through the motions of reducing protection and promoting 
liberalization, evident in a number of unilateral tariff reductions or removal of import restrictions as noted. 
 
3Bautista (1985). 
  
4See for example Sicat (1975). 
  
5See Tariff Commission Annual Report for 1982. 
  
6This is discussed in the section on fiscal policy. 
  
7This code already specifies the applicable tariff rates for every year of the tariff reform program and their eventual 
levels. 
  
8Executive Order (EO) 609 AND 632-A embody the former while EO 706 the latter. 
 
9See World Bank (1984). 
  
10World Bank (1982). 
  
11Refer to Table I.18 in Part I of the report. 
  
12The overall protection to the economy must be reckoned by the relative changes in the EPR’s of different 
Commodities.  While consumer goods EPR’s declined between 1974 and 1979 the protection to the other industries 
(intermediate goods, inputs into construction, capital goods) increased. 
  
13The effect of this on EPR really depends on where the exemptions fall, whether into inputs to production or final 
goods.  An increase in the former increases EPR while an increase in the latter decreases protection. 
  
14One major study on the incentive system on trade and industry is Bautista, Power and Associates (1979). 
  
15World Bank (1984). 
  
16MAAB No. 7 (1981). 
  
17See IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions (1981). 
  
18CB Circular No. 849. 
  
19MAAB No. 39. 
  
20World bank (1984). 
  
21MAAB No. 1. 
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22See IMF,  Annual Report on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions (1984). 
 
23The distortion here comes from the fact that not only are sales tax  different for an imported product but even the 
calculation for the cost base of the imported good varies. 
  
24 World Bank (1984). 
 
25See IMF, Twenty-Third Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions (1982), p. 354.  
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PART V 
 
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
The Commitment to Trade Liberalization 
 
 Has there been any long-term commitment to trade liberalization in the 
Philippines?  The answer to this question is yes and no. 
 
- Yes, at least in an ex post sense, because we (appear to) observe a perhaps 
“classic” sequence of: 
- replacing QR’s by tariff (stage A) 
- promoting Manufactured exports (stage B) 
- liberalizing the manufacturing import-substitution sector (stage C) 
 
- No, in terms of coordinated and sustained intention i.e. ex ante. Stage A 
was formed by events (as in many countries). Stage B did not present nearly as 
fundamental a commitment to new exports as we see in the successful Southeast Asian  
NICs; if new exports were achieved (i.e. ex post), this was largely so for reasons other 
than specific export promotion measures. In fact Stage B, ex ante, was perhaps a weak 
compromise in the late 1960s/early 1970s between stronger forces wanting to increase 
intervention, planning and protection and weaker forces wanting a more open economy.  
As for stage C, it is difficult to see any systematic build-up of pressure within 
government for such a   thorough-going reform;  indeed the decision in favor of the Tariff 
Reform Program (TRP) may be better seen as a “palace coup” brought about by a 
technocratic minority, with World Bank help. It is difficult, in reality, to see any 
convinced and sustained commitment to trade liberalization in the government  as a 
whole. Perhaps in fact, we are witnessing, in political economy terms, a basically 
conservative society in which rent-creating controls suit business and government, while 
liberalization attempts are imposed every decade, either to correct the development of 
external disequilibrium or to bow in the direction of the liberal solutions that the Western 
international community tends to prescribe. 
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 But, in addition to this general suggested explanation for the absence of a long-
term commitment to trade liberalization, we also think, specifically, the consequences of 
the first (decontrol) episode – particularly in terms of the loss of profitability in 
manufacturing – came to be viewed very negatively, i.e. decontrol was not viewed as an 
entire success. We believe this perception  strengthened the hand of interventionist forces 
and put off the timetable for trade liberalization.  The motivation for this negative view of 
liberalization no doubt partly reflected a genuine sense of apparently wasted resources 
(e.g. in the development of overcapacity), but it also reflected what must have been the 
very large loss of rents in the manufacturing sector in the years following the 1962 
decontrol. 
 
The Episodes:  Success and Failure 
 
At the very least the 1960s decontrol and the 1970 devaluation packages 
succeeded in the medium-term as instruments of external stabilization, but in  both cases 
were overtaken by the reintroduction of expansionary macroeconomic policies while 
external conditions – i.e. the deteriorating terms of trade – did not help much. 
 As we have already stressed the interpretation of the apparent success of the 
second episode in restructuring exports is not straight-forward.  The role of formal export 
promotion measures was a necessary one, in the sense that manufactured exports would 
not have taken off without effective provisions for exporters to acquire imported inputs at 
world prices, but a limited one in the sense that the subsidies they provided to offset the 
anti-export bias of other trade policies were modest.  Instead the restructuring of exports 
has to be understood in terms of the more realistic exchange rate achieved with the 
decontrol (and cemented by devaluation in 1970), the collapse of the traditional export 
sector in the 1970 (largely as a result of world price developments, but also helped on its 
way by a growing commercial policy bias against these exports), and a  quite remarkable 
fall in the real wage in the period 1969-74 (a phenomenon not unconnected with 
movements in the real exchange rate and the terms of trade). One is entitled to ask 
whether this was a real liberalization episodes. 
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 The third episode is noteworthy for its failure and two specific points are worth 
making. First, compared to the other two episodes – and by any standard – the timing was 
wrong, though we should emphasize that a lot of this may be considered bad luck rather 
than bad judgement.  The wrong external conditions were constituted on the one hand by 
the more rapidly deteriorating terms of trade at the beginning of the 1980s than in the 
early 1960s or early 1970s, on the other hand by the severe recession in the OECD  
countries.  The wrong  internal condition where bad judgement may be more evident, was 
the growing precariousness of the external debt situation after 6 to 7 years of 
uninterrupted and large current-account balance-of-payments deficits.  (It may be the case 
that liberalization contributed to the economic crisis of 1963, though this must have been 
quite marginal). 
 Second, it appears that this potentially major reform was carried out with some 
disregard for its macroeconomic consequences, specifically the need for devaluation to 
accommodate the sport-term effects of liberalizing the domestic market for manufactures.  
Perhaps this may partly reflect what we have suggested to be the “palace coup” routine of 
the reform – a reform that was not put through the proper machinery of economic policy-
making. 
 Will the TFP survive the present crisis given the fact that the tariff reductions are 
continuing in accordance with plans?  It appears that for a number of import-substitution 
industries the liberalization philosophy behind TFP reinforced by the 1983 foreign 
exchange crisis may have indeed autonomous reforms that respond to international 
competitiveness. Without import privileges of the availability of exchange resources at an 
overvalued exchange rate efficiency may have become a guiding light for industry. On 
the other hand the reintroduction of non-tariff measures soon after the beginning of the 
TRP may have induced the survival of rent-seekers nurtured by an unchanged political 
economy of the country. While the crisis may have induced an important trait of reform 
its success depends on how much “water in the tariff” will eventually exist. 
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Export Promotion in the “Classical” Liberalization Sequence 
 
From an economic of view, it is difficult to see how the non-traditional export  
promotion experience of the 1970s – Philippine style – has a role to play in any 
sequencing of trade liberalization. We have suggested that such exports largely took 
place as an enclave activity, representing the export of unskilled labor. There have been 
no obvious effect at all on the import-substitution manufacturing sector. Yet from a 
political point of view, the export-promotion stage may eventually turn out to have an 
impact. If nothing else, the 1970s have seen the beginning of the building up of a political 
constituency of industrialists favoring a more open trade regime.       
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